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PUBLIC OPPOSITION TO HAZARDOUS WASTE 
SITES: THE SELF -DEFEATING APPROACH TO 
NATIONAL HAZARDOUS WASTE CONTROL UNDER 
SUBTITLE C OF THE RESOURCE CONSERVATION 
AND RECOVERY ACT OF 1976 
Sidney M. Wolr 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1976 Congress enacted the Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act (commonly known as RCRA)1 which completely re-
vamped federal regulation of solid waste disposal- and in Subtitle 
* Sidney Wolf is an Assistant Professor in the School of Public and Environmental Af-
fairs at Indiana University at South Bend, Indiana. He received his J.D. from the Univer-
sity of Iowa in 1975 and an M.A. in Urban and Regional Planning from the University of 
Iowa in 1974. 
1 Pub. L. No. 94-580, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1976). 
• RCRA revised in its entirety the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965, (Title II of Pub. L. 
No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 997 (Oct. 20, 1965), as amended by the Resource Recovery Act of 
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-512, 84 Stat. 1227 (Oct. 26, 1970). The Solid Waste Disposal Act of 
1965 was the first federal legislation dealing directly with the solid waste problem. It was 
primarily aimed at establishing a national research and development program for new and 
better methods to dispose properly of solid waste. It authorized the Secretary of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (HEW) to make grants to state and interstate agencies to study 
solid waste disposal and associated problems. The Resource Recovery Act of 1970 
amended the Solid Waste Disposal Act to include the promotion of resource recovery pro-
grams and added provisions for grants to these programs. It required HEW to submit to 
Congress a report on the feasibility of a system of national disposal sites for the storage 
and disposal of hazardous wastes. 
RCRA has two major objectives: first, to protect human health and the environment by 
subjecting solid waste and hazardous waste disposal to regulation; and second, to foster 
resource conservation and recovery for wastes . 
. State regulation of nonhazardous solid waste is primarily the subject of Subtitle D of 
RCRA, RCRA §§ 4001-4009, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6941-6949 (1976). Subtitle D directs the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency to develop guidelines for the acceptable land disposal of 
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C3 created the first federal regulatory program for the systematic 
control of hazardous waste. Subtitle C operates on the premise 
that public health and the environment can be protected through 
standards and requirements commanding the proper transporta-
tion, storage, treatment and disposal of hazardous waste. Con-
gress had ample justification to enact Subtitle C, for improper 
management of hazardous waste was long the rule and not the 
exception. This widespread mismanagement of hazardous waste 
caused and continues to cause hazardous waste discharges harm-
ing people, property and the environment .. ' Over the course of 
1978 proposed regulations were issued for various sections of Sub-
title C.II EPA issued part of the final regulations in February, 
1980,8 and the remainder of final and some interim final regula-
tions in May,7 all of which are to take effect on November 19, 
solid wastes which will serve as minimum standards by which states will evaluate and 
regulate disposal operations. Those solid waste land disposal sites that do not comply with 
EPA guidelines will be designated as "open dumps" and prohibited. EPA is also directed 
to establish guidelines for the development of state solid waste plans. These plans are to 
identify open dumps, prohibit the establishment of any new ones, and require that all non-
hazardous solid wastes either be used for resource recovery or disposed of in secure sani· 
tary landfills. Any existing open dumps which cannot be upgraded to meet the criteria for 
an acceptable sanitary landfill must be closed. 
Entirely excluded from regulation of hazardous and nonhazardous wastes under the 
Solid Waste Disposal Act as amended are discharges requiring permits pursuant to the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act and nuclear wastes regulated pursuant to the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954. RCRA § 1004(27), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1976). 
• RCRA §§ 3001-3011, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6931 (1976). 
• Section 212 of the Resource Recovery Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-512 directed HEW 
to submit to Congress a comprehensive report on hazardous waste disposal practices. EPA, 
created soon after, was given responsibility for the report and submitted it to Congress 
and the President on June 30, 1973, beginning serious congressional and executive branch 
consideration of hazardous waste control legislation. The major conclusions of the report 
were: management of the nation's hazardous waste was generally inadequate; hazardous 
waste disposal on land was increasing; and case studies made it clear that the public 
health and welfare were threatened by uncontrolled waste discharges into the environ· 
ment. See OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
AGENCY, REPORT TO CONGRESS: DISPOSAL OF HAZARDOUS WASTES (1974). 
• For draft regulations issued pursuant to Sections 3001, 3002, and 3004 of RCRA, see 
43 Fed. Reg. 58946 (1978). Other Subtitle C draft regulations published include: pursuant 
to Section 3003, 43 Fed. Reg. 18506-12 (1978); pursuant to Section 3006, 43 Fed. Reg. 
4336-73 (1978); pursuant to Section 3008, 43 Fed. Reg. 34738-47 (1978); and pursuant to 
Section 3010 and the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 43 Fed. Reg. 22626-34 
(1978). 
• Standards for generators and transporters of hazardous wastes pursuant to Sections 
3002 and 3003 of RCRA were issued at 45 Fed. Reg. 12732 and 12743 (1980), respectively 
(to be codified in 40 C.F.R. §§ 262 and 263). 
1 45 Fed. Reg. 33065-285 (1980) contains EPA regulations for a permit program for haz· 
ardous waste facilities and for the authorization of state hazardous waste programs respec· 
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Subtitle C, and EPA regulatory measures implementing it, de-
mand that hazardous wastes be treated, stored and disposed at 
waste facilities which are safe and sound. There is presently an 
acute shortage of environmentally suitable hazardous waste facili-
ties, and more facilities will have to be built or upgraded to ser-
vice growing hazardous waste generation in the manner pre-
scribed by Subtitle C regulations. Standing in the way of the 
expansion of environmentally adequate hazardous waste service 
capacity is citizen opposition to the siting of hazardous waste op-
erations in or near their communities. 
This article examines the seeming contradiction between 
staunch public opposition to hazardous waste facilities and our 
first national hazardous waste control statute which seeks to pro-
vide facilities which protect public health and the environment 
from hazardous waste pollution. At first glance, public opposition 
to newer, safer, hazardous waste facilities appears irrational and 
destructive to a long and much needed national hazardous waste 
control system. But first impressions are misleading, for public 
opposition to hazardous waste sites is a reaction to the failure of 
federaf and state governments in general, and RCRA in particu-
lar, to directly and effectively confront crucial hazardous waste 
issues of rightful public concern. 
This article begins with a brief overview and history of hazard-
ous waste pollution. Next, past inadequate hazardous waste regu-
lation is examined, and the statutory framework of Subtitle C is 
outlined. From this background the article proceeds into a discus-
sion of staunch citizen opposition to hazardous waste disposal 
and an examination of the justification for this opposition both in 
past inadequate regulation of hazardous wastes and in the serious 
shortcomings of Subtitle C control. Moreover, this section empha-
sizes that the major obstacle to implementing hazardous waste 
control is not public opposition but rather the lack of adequate 
financial and enforcement support for regulatory programs. Next 
the article finds that proposed EPA regulations do not provide 
adequate financial responsibility measures to ensure needed lia-
bility coverage for pollution at regulated waste sites or to ensure 
tively pursuant to Sections 3005 and 3006 of RCRA (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. Parts 122, 
123 and 124), and regulations for the identification of hazardous waste pursuant to Section 
3001 of RCRA and for facility s·.;andards pursuant to Section 3004 of RCRA (to be codified 
in 40 C.F.R. §§ 264, 265). 
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proper long-term care for closed waste sites. Finally, concluding 
that effective hazardous waste control requires the reduction of 
hazardous generation at its industrial sources, the article finds the 
major defect of national hazardous waste policy is in its failure to 
reduce waste growth. 
II. HAZARDOUS WASTE POLLUTION-A SHORT HISTORY 
There is no doubt that we have more than enough wastes to 
look after. Our advanced industrial society creates not only huge 
amounts of goods and services but also prodigious amounts of 
wastes as the flotsam and jetsam of production, consumption, and 
ordinary living. Last year alone, the United States generated 130 
million metric tons of municipal refuse, 5 million metric tons (dry 
weight) of sewage sludge, 430 million metric tons (dry weight) of 
agricultural wastes, over 3 billion tons of mining wastes, and 
about 344 million or more metric tons of industrial wastes.8 Harm 
to the environment and public health from most of these huge 
volumes of wastes can be prevented through relatively simple 
methods of proper sanitary landfilling and through material con-
servation methods such as recycling and materials and energy 
recovery. 8 
All wastes are not equal, however, in their potential for in-
flicting harm upon people and nature, or in their susceptibility to 
proper management. Some wastes pose significantly greater 
hazards than others; those belong to a particular species of wastes 
called hazardous wastes.lO Of the 344 million metric tons of haz-
ardous industrial wastes generated yearly, approximately 47.5 
million metric tons, well over 10 percent, are potentially hazard-
ous.ll Remarkably, 90 percent of our industrial hazardous waste 
8 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ANNUAL ACTIVITIES UNDER THE RESOURCE CON-
SERVATION ACT OF 1976, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS FISCAL YEAR 
1978 (1979), at 1-2 [hereinafter cited as 2ND ANNUAL RCRA REPORT]. 
• Resource recovery generally refers to collecting homogenous wastes for reuse as mater-
ials or energy in manufacturing operations. A. BARTON, RESOURCE RECOVERY AND RE-
CYCLING 3, 6 (1979). Other definitions for terms related to resource recovery and resource 
conservation are found in RCRA § 1004(18)-(24), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(18)-(24) (1976). 
,. Subtitle C defines a waste as hazardous if it exhibits either of two effects: 1) the waste 
can cause or significantly contribute to death or serious irreversible or incapacitating ill-
ness because of its quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteris-
tics or 2) the waste poses a substantial or potential danger to human health or the envi-
ronment when mismanaged. RCRA § 1004(5), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1976). 
11 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR 
SUBTITLE C (January 1979) at VI-2 [hereinafter cited as DRAFT EIS]. 
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has been disposed of in a manner actually or potentially harmful 
to public health and the environment. I2 
Stirred by the combination of spectacular and widely publi-
cized hazardous waste catastrophies, such as that which occurred 
at Love Canal/3 and by an aroused public consciousness of the 
threatening nature of hazardous wastes, public concern over haz-
ardous waste pollution has been growing rapidly in recent years. 
The dangers of hazardous wastes are very real and often dra-
matic. Hazardous wastes can be toxic, carcinogenic, mutagenic, 
teratogenic, radioactive, flammable, explosive, biologically persis-
" [d., at V-36. 1. The hazardous waste catastrophe at Love Canal stirred great national interest in haz-
ardous waste pollution. Hooker Chemical Company used its own Love Canal Waste Land-
fill in Niagara Falls, New York as a chemical dumpsite from 1942 through 1953. Hooker 
buried at least 82 chemicals at Love Canal, 11 of which are widely suspected of being 
carcinogens. Hooker sold the property in 1953 to the local school board for $1 with a 
clause in the deed releasing the company from any claims for future damage caused by the 
buried chemicals. Soon after the site was sold, a school and playground were built on it 
and homes sprung up in the surrounding area. An internal company memorandum dated 
June 18, 1958 reported that three to four children playing at the site were burned by 
buried chemicals that year, but Hooker decided not to inform the general public of the 
possible risks unless the school board advised it to do so. However, that never occurred 
and Hooker maintained their public silence about the potential danger of the site, appar-
ently out of fear of legal reprisals. It was not until 1976 that the site began to release large 
amounts of hazardous wastes. Fumes and leachate, a mixture of groundwater and waste, 
began seeping into the basements of homes and rising to the surface of yards and chil-
dren's play areas. Incredible stories of chemical assaults on people and property have been 
reported by local residents. Visitors have had the soles of their shoes corroded through, 
children and dogs have received burns from playing outside, gardens have burnt up, fence 
posts have been eaten away, and residents report that their neighbors have died from 
numerous kinds of cancer. The New York State Health Department believes the site has 
caused the area's high incidence of spontaneous abortions, birth defects, and numerous 
cases of serious illnesses. The cancer rate in the vicinity is 30 times the national average. 
The State evacuated all pregnant women and children under the age of two in the areas 
surrounding Love Canal because these two groups are most vulnerable to the adverse ef-
fects of exposure to toxic substances. Numerous residents have voluntarily abandoned 
their homes, and property near the dump site is virtually unsaleable. New York's U.S. 
Senator Patrick Moynihan estimates the cost of clean-up of the contaminated land and 
water at Love Canal and at two other Hooker disposal sites in Niagara Falls could reach 
$280 million, and citizens in pending lawsuits are seeking up to $2 billion in damages from 
Hooker Chemical. EPA estimates that it may cost $20 million or more to relocate 200 
families, buy property, perform remedial construction and conduct additional testing and 
monitoring at Love Canal. Federal assistance so far includes $2 million in disaster relief 
and a $4 million grant taken out of its RCRA appropriation for FY 79. See DRAFT EIS, 
supra note 11, at VI-6; 2ND ANNUAL RCRA REPORT, supra note 8, at 1-3 to 4; lO ENVIR. 
REP. (BNA) 27 (May 5, 1979). For an extensive review of the Love Canal disaster, see 
Hazardous and Toxic Waste Disposal, Jt. Hearings Before the Subcommittees on Envi-
ronmental Pollution and ReSOurce Protection of the Senate Comm. on Environment and 
Public Works, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (March 28-29, 1979). 
---------------
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tent, and can accumulate in living organisms.14 Hazardous wastes 
have even proven lethal. 1G 
While the chief source of the most hazardous of hazardous 
wastes is industry, they may also come from many other sources, 
and may take many different forms.ls From over 311 case studies 
of hazardous waste pollution incidents the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) has determined that hazardous wastes enter 
the environment and damage it and public health through one or 
more of six major pathways.l7 The most prevalent and menacing 
kind of hazardous waste pollution is contamination of ground-
water through leachate.ls Fifty percent of the nation's drinking 
water supply comes from the ground, and the percentage in-
creases annually.ls Groundwater contamination by hazardous 
wastes is extremely elusive-usually not discovered until well af-
ter damage has occurred-and can endure for decades or even 
centuries. In most cases cleanup is neither technologically nor ec-
onomically feasible. Once an underground water drinking supply 
is contaminated by toxic wastes it is no longer safe to use. The 
five other avenues hazardous waste injury can travel are: land sur-
face contamination by way of runoff;20 air pollution by open burn-
14 See DRAFT EIS, supra note 11, at V-I to V-11 . 
.. For instance, the December 8, 1977 explosion and fire at the Rollins Environmental 
Services chemical waste treatment plant in Logan Township, New Jersey killed seven con-
struction workers. For an expanded description of the Rollins disaster, see note 205, int,.a. 
1. Hazardous wastes come in many forms-solids, powders, liquids, sludges and gases. 
The generators of hazardous wastes vary widely, and include industries, the military and 
nonmilitary activities of the federal government, agriculture, research laboratories and 
hospitals, utilities, mines and households. HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND 
COMMERCE, MATERIALS RELATING TO THE RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY ACT OF 
1976, at 14 (April 1976) [hereinafter HOUSE RCRA MATERIALS]. 
17 [d. at 40-42. I. Sixty-four percent of EPA's case studies of hazardous waste damage involved ground-
water contamination by leachate, a mixture of wastes and water which can travel to the 
land surface or to groundwater supplies. One of the many examples of groundwater con-
tamination occurred at a municipal landfill in Delaware. Thirteen years after the landfill 
had been closed, it was discovered that chemical and biological contaminants were leach-
ing into the groundwater. The affected groundwater was the drinking supply source for 
40,000 people. The estimated cost for decontaminating the groundwater is $26 million. 
HOUSE RCRA MATERIALS, supra note 16, at 40. I. [d. at 41. 
s. A second major form of EPA-documented hazardous waste pollution is land surface 
contamination by way of run-off, accounting for 37% of EPA's case studies of reported 
incidents of hazardous waste pollution. One EPA-documented case of surface contamina-
tion from run-off was caused by the discarding of drums containing numerous toxic and 
corrosive substances, including cyanide, resulting in the death of three cattle from cyanide 
poisoning. Authorities later discovered that surface water run-off showed a cyanide con-
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ing, evaporation, sublimation or wind erosion;21 poisoning through 
direct contact with living organisms;22 poisoning through the food 
chain;23 and fire and explosions.24 
EPA has prepared in excess of over 400 case studies of recent 
hazardous waste pollution ranging from extremely serious to mi-
nor, and has concluded that from the haphazard way in which 
virtually all of these incidents were discovered the vast majority 
of hazardous waste pollution occurrences are not reported at all.26 
There are between 32,000 and 50,000 treatment, storage and dis-
posal sites containing hazardous wastes, 20,000 of which are ac-
tive and the rest closed or E!.bandoned.28 Of the many active and 
centration 1800 times in excess of the U.S. Public Health Service standard for drinking 
water. HOUSE RCRA MATERIALS, supra note 16, at 41. 
II An EPA case study of air pollution from hazardous waste reports the quarantining of 
20,000 Louisiana cattle after they had absorbed from the air hexachlorobenzene, a toxic 
waste that had been dumped at a nearby rural landfill. Local farmers lost $3.9 million and 
Louisiana and the federal government spent over $150,000 just for sampling and testing. 
HOUSE RCRA MATERIALS, supra note 16, at 41. 
•• Poisoning from direct contact with hazardous waste usually occurs when surplus toxic 
wastes like pesticides or industrial chemicals are not properly disposed. For example, in 
California eighteen persons were hospitalized and two firemen contracted permanent disa-
bling lung damage after they inhaled nematocide residue emitted from a 300-pound can-
nister improperly disposed of by the manufacturer. The incident was triggered when a 
man picked up the cannister, planning to use it as a "nice stand-up fireplace." HOUSE 
RCRA MATERIALS, supra note 16, at 41. 
•• Of all the types of hazardous waste damage, poisoning through the food chain is the 
most difficult to identify, trace, and confirm due to the great difficulty in showing causa-
tion and obtaining scientific evidence that isolates the cause of the injury to a specific 
toxic source. One clear-cut case of toxic injury from food contamination occurred in New 
Mexico when contaminated pork was eaten. Hogs, scavenging for food at a local dump, ate 
grain that had been discarded there. The grain had been treated with mercury as a seed 
dressing. The hogs were slaughtered locally and three children contracted alkyl mercury 
poisoning after eating the pork. A pregnant woman who ate the contaminated pork gave 
birth to a child suffering from congenital mercury poisoning. HOUSE RCRA MATERIALS, 
supra note 16, at 42. 
The most tragic, extensive, and heavily publicized case of mercury poisoning due to 
mercury-laced wastes occurred in the 1950's in the seaside town of Minamata, Japan. 
Hundreds of persons contracted severe mercury poisoning from eating fish and shellfish 
contaminated by mercury which had been dumped into Minamata Bay by.a local chemical 
firm. Minamata's disease, as this episode of mercury poisoning came to be called, resulted 
in adults and children suffering serious neurological injuries-many children and adults 
becoming spastic, retarded, afflicted with constant pain and faced with an early death. See 
w. SMITH, MINAMATA (1975) . 
.. See note 205, infra, for the 1977 spectacular fire and explosion at the Rollins Chemi-
cal Waste Facility in Logan Township, New Jersey . 
•• ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, STATE DECISION-MAKER's GUIDE FOR HAZARDOUS 
WASTE MANAGEMENT at 111-12 (1977) [hereinafter cited as EPA DECISION-MAKER'S GUIDE) . 
•• As reported by EPA Deputy Assistant Administrator Steffen Plehn in An Open Let-
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inactive hazardous waste sites, up to 2000 pose a significant risk 
of imminent hazard to the public, and the total cost to respond to 
emergencies and take remedial action at all problem sites could 
exceed $44 billion.27 
The wrack and ruin inflicted upon the environment and public 
health by hazardous waste is not surprising considering that at 
least 90 percent of the industrial hazardous wastes generated dur-
ing the last few decades have been treated or disposed of in an 
environmentally unsuitable manner jeopardizing human health 
and natural systems.18 Furthermore, large, but generally undeter-
mined amounts of industrial hazardous wastes have been dumped 
illegally onto the land and into the water.le Organized crime has 
even been implicated in the profitable illegal dumping business.8o 
The most insidious and yet common feature of hazardous waste 
pollution is the long gestation period between faulty disposal and 
onset of noticeable harm to people and the environment.81 At 
ter from EPA to You, NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT (April 23, 
1979). Also note that the waste sites across the nation include 100,000 industrial impound-
ments (pits, lagoons, ponds), 20,000 municipal refuse landfills, and 23,000 municipal sludge 
disposal sites, 2ND ANNUAL RCRA REPORT, supra note 8, at 1-3. 
n Plehn, supra note 26 . 
• s Of the major conventional methods of disposing or treating hazardous wastes, the 
portion of each that occurs in an environmentally unacceptable manner is as follows: sur-
face impoundments, 99.9 %; dumps and landfills, 95 %; incinerators, 55 %; and almost 
100% for road application, landspreading injection, and deepwell injection. Draft EiS, 
supra note 11, at VII-30. Eighty percent of all industrial hazardous wastes are disposed on 
land by the environmentally unsound methods of unsecured landfills and unlined surface 
impoundments such as lagoons. In comparison, only 0.1 % of industrial hazardous wastes 
have been disposed in environmentally-adequate lined impoundments and only 2.3% at 
secure landfills. Only 5.6 % of industrial hazardous waste is incinerated for treatment and 
detoxification under controlled, environmentally safe conditions, while about 10% of the 
industrial hazardous wastes are incinerated under uncontrolled, unsafe conditions. See 
EPA DECISION-MAKER'S GUIDE, supra note 25, at 11-15 . 
• e The illegal, purposeful and surreptitious dumping of hazardous wastes is sometimes 
called "midnight dumping," a literal event as well as a euphemism. The wanton illegal 
dumping of hazardous wastes includes discarding them in sewer systems ("down the 
drain," so to speak), onto roadsides, into ponds, rivers and lakes, in quarries, onto field 
and in forests, and numerous other pernicious ways. Illegal, Unwitting Disposal Imperils 
the Chain of Life, in NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 26. 
3. Organized crime involvement is no surprise, considering that the illegal dumping bus-
iness is highly lucrative. On April 5, 1979, Glenn Paulson, New Jersey's Assistant Commis-
sioner for Science and Research, told the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investi-
gation that organized crime elements ran the Chemical Control Corporation site in 
Elizabeth, New Jersey, where 34,000 gallons of hazardous wastes had been illegally dis-
posed and abandoned. 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 2324 (April 13, 1979). 
.. There are two types of hazardous waste damage risks in terms of the time over which 
they can materialize: there are those hazardous wastes whose effects can be acute, that is, 
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Love Canal significant waste releases did not begin to appear un-
til twenty-five years after the closing of the chemical waste 
dump.32 The latency period for the occurrence of waste releases 
into the environment can stretch over years or decades. Hence, a 
major reason so many hazardous waste pollution incidents go un-
reported is that the health disorders and environmental injuries 
they cause may not become apparent until years after initial or 
prolonged exposure, and direct causative relationships are diffi-
cult to trace.33 Because the victims of hazardous waste poisoning 
seldom know the true cause of their health disorders, they cannot 
take timely or proper actions to prevent or treat those disorders.34 
As a result of the extended time lag between improper hazardous 
wastes activities and the onset or discovery of harm, we can ex-
pect continuing damage incidents to occur in the future from 
wastes previously improperly stored, treated, or disposed of at 
sites closed, abandoned or forgotten long ago.31i 
III. HAZARDOUS WASTE MISMANAGEMENT AND SUBTITLE C OF 
RCRA 
The principal reason for the near universal mismanagement of 
hazardous waste has been the inadequate, permissive, and in 
many cases nonexistent regulatory control of hazardous wastes by 
state government.36 Environmentally acceptable hazardous waste 
whose risks are immediate; and there are those hazardous wastes whose effects can be 
chronic, that is, likely to occur over an extended period. 2ND ANNUAL RCRA REPORT, 
supra note 8, at 11-6. 
•• See note 13, supra . 
• a DRAFT EIS, supra note 11, at S-12. 
a. The disease-causing, teratogenic, mutagenic and carcinogenic agents in hazardous 
wastes may often remain dormant in the environment or body for years before injury ma-
terializes or becomes evident. These toxicants may be transferred to future generations in 
the form of gene mutations or birth defects. Seemingly low levels of toxicants may accu-
mulate undetected in the body for several years until a threshold level is surpassed and 
injury occurs. Originally innocuous substances in the wastes may become toxic, and toxi-
cants may become even more potent when they combine with water, air and other sub-
stances. Detecting and treating toxic injuries and diseases is undermined by the numerous 
ways these substances can enter and injure the body. The physician finds treatment com-
plicated since cause-effect relationships, or the etiology of the malady, cannot be easily 
isolated from the many other environmental toxins and pollutants an individual en-
counters in his life. Preventive measures to protect those exposed to a toxicant in hazard-
ous wastes cannot be taken if the precise cause of the injury is unknown or indeterminate. 
See Soble, A Proposal for the Administrative Compensation of Victims of Toxic Sub-
stance Pollution: A Model Act, 14 HARVARD JOURNAL OF LEGISLATION 683, 686 (1977). 
a. DRAFT EIS, supra note 11, at 8-12. 
.. Prior to RCRA's passage in 1976, only five states had more or less comprehensive 
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treatment and disposal facilities are extremely costly. Before the 
passage of ReRA the federal government stayed out of hazardous 
waste control. Not faced with the coercion of regulation, hazard-
ous waste generators sought to rid themselves of their hazardous 
waste in the least expensive legal, or sometimes illegal, way, rarely 
giving any regard to the well-being of the environment or pub-
lic.87 The typical criteria for selecting a site for a hazardous waste 
facility was not the environmental suitability of the site but low 
land cost, ease of land acquisition, nearness to waste sources, and 
ease of site approval. 8a Minimal attention was given to whether 
hazardous waste management legislation-Minnesota, California, Illinois, New York and 
Oregon. While vastly superior to hazardous waste legislation in other states, these statutes 
did not result in totally adequate hazardous waste management programs due to a lack of 
funding and manpower. At the time RCRA was enacted, half the states assigned at most 
one person to work full time on hazardous waste. While legislation in all states addressed 
hazardous waste control to some degree, the scope of actual state regulation ranged from 
virtually nothing to what appear to be comprehensive programs. In most states hazardous 
waste regulation was not based on specific hazardous waste acts but instead on existing 
solid waste statutes. These solid waste statutes were generally devoid of guidelines, criteria 
or standards properiy tailored to the radically different needs of hazardous waste control. 
Thus, the regulation of hazardous waste that did exist was largely a matter of broad and 
sometimes incorrect interpretation of state solid waste statutes. See HOUSE RCRA MATER-
IALS, supra note 16, at 26; DRAFT EIS, supra note 11, at 11-18 to 36 . 
• 7 One example of illegal dumping on the grandiose scale was the dumping of highly 
toxic polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB's) along 210 miles of rural North Carolina roadways 
by a waste disposal outfit. Jt. Hearings on Hazardous and Toxic Waste Disposal, supra 
note 13, at 84-85 (statement of Thomas C. Joriing, EPA Assistant Administrator for Water 
and Waste Management). The "Valley of the Drums" in Shepardsville, Kentucky repre-
sents another spectacular example of reckless, illegal hazardous waste dumping. T.A. Tay-
lor, a waste dealer, illegally disposed over 17,000 barrels of waste of undetermined toxicity, 
explosiveness, and flammability on a 23-acre site which made up his backyard. An unde-
termined amount of waste material was buried in drums at the site, thousands of barrels 
were stacked on top of the site, and no attempt was made to prevent the site from pollut-
ing surface water. Some of the materials found in the "Valley of the Drums" include alkyl 
aromatics, ketones, many alcohols, organic acids, and heavy metals. Thousands of drums 
in a deteriorating condition were stacked on the property. Many of the drums had become 
swollen by internal pressure and many burst, spilling their contents onto the ground. For 
this and other examples of illegal or highly improper waste disposal, see SUBCOMM. ON 
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COM-
MERCE, REPORT ON HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (September 1979), at 
9-18 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT ON HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL J • 
•• The suitability of a site for a hazardous waste facility, particularly in respect to land 
disposal and waste water impoundments, depends on geology, climate, topography, hydrol-
ogy, ecology, and other environmental factors which contribute to or detract from lending 
overall natural protection to the environment. To the extent that favorable natural site 
characteristics are lacking, engineered techniques are required to contain and isolate haz-
ardous wastes from the environment. See EPA DECISION-MAKER'S GUIDE, supra note 25, at 
69. 
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the site had natural or engineered features that could protect 
against waste releases.39 The same disregard for environmental 
and public health protection characterized the operation of haz-
ardous waste facilities. 
A. RCRA and Subtitle C 
The menacing character of hazardous wastes and the grim his-
tory of pollution caused by inadequately regulated and improper 
treatment and disposal activities has stirred strong and growing 
opposition by citizens against the siting of hazardous waste facili-
ties in or near their communities. Recognizing that public health 
and the environment were compromised by the uncontrolled and 
unsound management of hazardous wastes, Congress enacted 
Subtitle C of RCRA, which directs EPA to establish a compre-
hensive, "cradle to grave" system for regulating hazardous wastes 
from the generator, through transportation and storage, and to 
final treatment and disposal.4o 
Six major sections of Subtitle C, 3001 through 3006,41 provide 
the blueprint for a regulatory program. Section 3001 calls for the 
identification of wastes which are hazardous and thus subject to 
Subtitle C regulation. U Section 3002 addresses the standards gov-
erning hazardous waste generators43 and includes a "manifest" 
system which is meant to track wastes from cradle to grave to 
•• [d. at 69 . 
•• RCRA §§ 3001-3011, 42 u.S.C. §§ 6921-6931 (1976) . 
• , 42 u.S.C. §§ 6921-6926 (1976) . 
•• In order to be subject to Subtitle C regulation, a waste must be identified as hazard-
ous. For a definition of hazardous wastes, see RCRA § 1004(5), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1976), 
as explained at note 10, supra. Section 3001 provides two measures or methods by which 
EPA can establish a waste as hazardous: 1) by a list of specific wastes deemed to be haz-
ardous and 2) by a set of identifying characteristics for determining whether any waste is 
hazardous. In its preparation of a list of specified hazardous wastes and a set of identifying 
characteristics, Section 3001 directs EPA to take into account such factors as "toxicity, 
persistence, degradability in nature, potential for accumulation in tissue and other related 
factors such as flammability, corrosiveness and other hazardous chracteristics." 42 U.S.C. § 
6921 (1976). 
.. EPA is directed to promulgate standards governing the activities of hazardous waste 
generators covering the following six areas: 1) record keeping to identify the quantities, 
composition and disposal of hazardous wastes; 2) the labeling of containers used for stor-
age, treatment or disposal of hazardous waste; 3) the proper containerization of hazardous 
wastes; 4) information on the general chemical composition of hazardous wastes to persons 
transporting, treating, storing or disposing of these wastes; 5) compliance with a manifest 
system to assure that hazardous wastes reach environmentally acceptable and permitted 
facilities; and 6) submission of periodic reports to regulatory authorities on the quantities 
and disposition of hazardous wastes. 42 U.S.C. § 6922 (1976). 
----------------------------------- ------
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assure they are disposed of properly. H Section 3003 authorizes 
standards for the transportation of hazardous waste.46 Section 
3004 authorizes standards for the owners and operators of facili-
ties which store, treat or dispose of hazardous waste.46 Section 
3005 establishes a permit program for hazardous waste facilities. 47 
44 The manifest is defined by RCRA as a form for identifying the quantity, composition, 
origin, routing, and destination of hazardous waste from the point of generation to the 
point of disposal, treatment, or storage. RCRA § 1004(12), 42 U.S.C. § 690<1(12) (1976). A 
hazardous waste program can only be effective if it assures regulatory surveillance over the 
whole life cycle of hazardous wastes, that is, from "cradle to grave." To keep track of 
hazardous waste the regulatory program has to require the hazardous-waste hauler to re-
port where and when the wastes are picked up and delivered. Jt. Hearings on Hazardous 
and Toxic Waste Disposal, supra note 13, at 41. 
The Subtitle C regulations establish a manifest system in which the generator must give 
the hauler a manifest indicating the quantity and composition of the waste being hauled, 
and the hauler in turn surrenders the manifest to the treatment or disposal facility receiv-
ing the wastes. The treatment and disposal facility sends back the manifest to the genera-
tor as confirmation that the wastes have been received according to the generator's in-
structions. If the generator does not receive the manifest back within thirty-five days after 
sending off the wastes, this must be reported to EPA. For record-keeping purposes, the 
generator must keep a copy of manifests or delivery documents. The filed manifests serve 
as the basis for the generator's yearly reports to regulatory authorities on the amounts and 
kinds of hazardous wastes generated and shipped off-site. The unreturned manifests are 
the basis for quarterly exception reports from the generator which specify the occasions 
where manifests were not returned to the generator, indicating the shipment may either 
have been lost in transport, illegally disposed, or otherwise mishandled. This combination 
of manifest and reporting requirements for the shipment of hazardous wastes by their 
generators is expected to result in the near complete elimination of illegal or surreptitious 
dumping of hazardous wastes by assuring their delivery to environmentally acceptable fa-
cilities. See 45 Fed. Reg. 33226-32 (1980) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 262.20-.23, 
262.40-.42, 263.20-.23, 264.70-.77) for the manifest and reporting standards . 
.. Section 3003(a) of RCRA directs EPA to promulgate regulatory standards for the 
transportation of hazardous waste to at least include requirements for recordkeeping, re-
stricting transportation to properly labeled wastes, compliance with the manifest system, 
and restricting the transportation of hazardous waste only to permitted facilities. 42 
U.S.C. § 6923(a) (1976). Section 3003(b) calls for coordination and cooperation between 
EPA and the Department of Transportation in regulating the shipping of hazardous 
materials subject to both RCRA and the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act. 42 
U.S.C. § 6923(b) (1976). 
4. Section 3004 directs EPA to promulgate performance standards for facilities storing, 
disposing or treating hazardous wastes. At the minimum these standards must include 
requirements covering the following seven activities: 1) record keeping; 2) reporting, moni-
toring, and inspection and compliance with the manifest system; 3) facility operating stan-
dards; 4) siting, design and construction standards; 5) contingency plans for hazardous 
waste damage occurrences; 6) compliance with permit requirements for hazardous waste 
facilities; 7) standards in respect to continuity of operation, training of facility personnel, 
and financial responsibility for hazardous waste damage liability. 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (1976). 
n Section 3005 requires that hazardous waste facilities obtain an operating permit is-
sued by EPA or by an authorized state program. The purpose of the permit is to assure 
that hazardous waste facilities fully comply with the standards promulgated pursuant to 
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Finally, section 3006 directs EPA to establish guidelines for the 
authorization of voluntarily adopted state hazardous waste pro-
grams in lieu of EPA administration for states which comply with 
statutory and regulatory requirements.48 
IV. PUBLIC OPPOSITION TO HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES 
In recent years public opposition to the siting of hazardous 
waste facilities has intensified.49 This public outcry joins citizen 
section 3004. 42 u.s.c. § 6925 (1976). 
,. Congress wanted to encourage the states to adopt their own hazardous waste control 
programs, directing EPA to assist the states in the development of these programs and 
allowing states, rather than EPA, to voluntarily administer and enforce comprehensive 
hazardous waste programs authorized by EPA. Section 3006 provides two types of author-
ized programs-interim and full authorization. To qualify for full authorization the state 
program must be equivalent to the federal program, be consistent with federal and state 
programs nationwide, and provide adequate enforcement of compliance with RCRA regu-
lations. Interim authorization is available to those states with existing hazardous waste 
control programs that do not qualify for full authorization at the time the RCRA regula-
tions first go into effect but which wish time to build a fully authorized program. Re-
stricted to no more than two years, interim authorization allows a state to continue run-
ning its own hazardous waste control program and in the meantime enjoy the opportunity 
to make an orderly transition to a fully authorized hazardous waste control program. Sim-
ply having an existing program is not sufficient to render a state eligible for interim au-
thorization; its program must be "substantially equivalent" to EPA's own comprehensive 
program and to its requirements for a fully authorized state program. 42 U.S.C. § 6926 
(1976). 
,. For an excellent review of the major issues surrounding public opposition to hazard-
ous waste sites, see COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, How TO DISPOSE OF 
HAZARDOUS WASTE-A SERIOUS QUESTION THAT NEEDS TO BE RESOLVED (December 18, 
1978) [hereinafter GAO REPORT-How TO DISPOSE OF HAZARDOUS WASTE). 
Recent fervent public opposition to hazardous waste sites has generally been successful. 
From 1975 to 1978 the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency identified 16 candidate sites 
for a chemical landfill. Citizens and local governments in every designated area protested 
that they did not want the landfill, and the state agency backed down. Vehement public 
opposition was massed against plans for a new hazardous waste landfill in New York which 
the state's Department of Environmental Conservation considered to be environmentally 
sound. Two local groups successfully obtained an injunction in the lower state court to bar 
excavation, but a higher state court overturned the injunction on a state appeal. The State 
of Washington's Department of Ecology spent over four years and evaluated twenty sites 
in trying to locate a hazardous waste disposal site. After the most desirable site was re-
jected by county officials and they repeatedly failed to find a site on private or public land, 
the Department of Ecology proposed a site on the federally-owned Hanford Reservation, 
presently the home for a nuclear power plant and some nuclear waste disposal. Fierce 
opposition arose from the public, and the City of Richland, located twelve miles from the 
proposed site, filed a lawsuit challenging the sufficiency of the state's environmental im-
pact statement. The State of Washington abandoned the Hanford site in the face of this 
public resistance. The Department of Ecology then proposed an alternative site on the 
Hanford Reservation and reached an agreement with the City of Richland on procedures 
for environmental impact statement review and for administering the landfill. In Penn-
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protest against the siting of other industrial facilities which can 
imperil the public and environment, such as refineries, liquefied 
natural gas operations, oil and gas pipelines, nuclear power 
plants, high power electrical transmission lines, and so on. Subti-
tle C's promise of stringent new regulation of hazardous waste fa-
cilities has failed to dissipate citizen fears and opposition to haz-
ardous waste facilities. Ironically, the statute may exacerbate 
citizen concern and opposition to hazardous waste operations. 
This failure is due, in part, to the fact that Subtitle C is not suc-
cessful in surmounting the problem of locating hazardous waste 
facilities in or near populated communities.lIo However, Subtitle 
C's failure to overcome public opposition is also due to the en-
trenched nature of that opposition. No one wants a waste disposal 
site in their back yard, so to speak. III In turn, the ferocity of citi-
zen opposition can be traced to the poor history of hazardous 
waste control. Combining people and hazardous waste operations 
in the same area frequently resUlts in public opposition. 
A. Subtitle C-Failure to Mollify Public Opposition 
Hazardous waste facilities can be categorized as either off-site 
or on-site, the distinction being in their proximity to the indus-
trial waste generator. Nationwide there are 100,000 industrial 
waste water impoundments and landfills situated on or near plant 
grounds. III These are called on-site facilities. Approximately 82 
percent of the industrial hazardous waste generated in recent 
years has been stored, treated or disposed of on-site.lIs Most re-
sYlvania the EPA proposed a demonstration project on federal land at which municipal 
sludge from Philadelphia would be processed into a lower cost fertilizer for local agricul-
tural use. Within one week of the first press release announcing the project, local citizens 
began fighting, elected officials protested, the public was up in arms, and petitions to kill 
the project were circulated. EPA quickly dropped the project. [d., at 13-15. 
10 A good example of the usual location of hazardous waste sites in or near populated 
areas is Contra Costa County. Located immediately northwest of San Francisco, it is the 
final resting place for 80 percent of northern California's hazardous wastes. Contra Costa's 
dangerous waste burden is in addition to, and primarily a result of, the numerous oil refin-
ing operations in and immediately surrounding the county. See testimony of Jean B. Siri, 
President of the West Contra Costa Conservation League, in Environmental Protection 
Agency, Proceedings: 1975 Public Meeting on Hazardous Waste Management, 1200-06 
(1976). 
II See note 284, infra. 
I' 9 ENVlR. REP. (BNA) 1301-02 (Nov. 18, 1978). 
II DRAPT EIS, supra note 11, at VII-32. 
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ported incidents of public opposition concern off-site facilities. Ii. 
Residents in industrial zones often become inured after many 
years to the noxious industrial activities around them. Further-
more, they are usually unaware either of the existence of hazard-
ous substances at plant waste sites or of the fact that virtually all 
on-site hazardous waste activities have been egregiously misman-
aged in a manner endangering people and nature.1i1i 
Fifteen percent of the nation's hazardous wastes are treated, 
stored, or disposed off-site, either at the 110 facilities specifically 
operated to receive dangerous wastes or at the scores of 
thousands of public and private landfills, impoundments, and 
other facilities taking industrial waste.1i6 Most off-site facilities 
are located in or near industrialized areas because these are the 
only locations which can provide the large waste stream volumes 
such facilities require to be economical and because the costs and 
risks of hazardous waste transportation sharply increase with dis-
tance. By their very nature, off-site facilities cannot help but 
arouse citizen protests. Special chemical landfills and lagoons, 
chemical and biological treatment works, incineration operations 
and other types of off-site hazardous waste operations are con-
spicuous as to their functions and dangers. Such facilities handle 
large volumes and many varieties of extremely pernicious wastes 
which pose various types of hazards.1i7 A proposal to build or ex-
•• See generally GAO REPORT-How To DISPOSE OF HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 49, 
at 13-14 . 
•• EPA reports that in a study of 50 on-site hazardous waste facilities for which no 
damage had been previously reported, it found 43 (or 86 percent) of the facilities were 
releasing dangerous amounts of toxins into groundwater that made it unfit as drinking 
supply. On-site hazardous waste storage, treatment and disposal have a much poorer re-
cord of environmental contamination than off-site practices. Sixty-three percent of the 
over 400 case studies of hazardous waste pollution occurred at on-site operations. 9 ENVIR. 
REP. (BNA) 1301-02 (Nov. 17, 1978); GAO REPORT-How TO DISPOSE OF HAZARDOUS 
WASTE, supra note 49, at 9 . 
•• EPA DECISION-MAKER'S GUIDE, supra note 25, at 43 . 
.. The estimated proportion of hazardous wastes treated or disposed at off-site facilities 
by each of the thirteen categories of industry that generate virtually all the industrial 
hazardous waste is, on an unweighted basis, as follows: 1) electronic components manufac-
turing-66 percent; 2) electroplating and metal finishing-81 percent; 3) inorganic chemi-
cals-15 percent; 4) leather tanning and finishing-90 percent; 5) metal smelting and re-
fining-2 percent; 6) organic chemicals-5 percent; 7) petroleum refining-56 percent; 8) 
pharmaceuticals-60 percent; 9) storage and primary batteries-65 percent; 10) tex-
tiles-51 percent; 11) paint and allied products-90 percent; 12) petroleum re-refining-76 
percent; and 13) special machinery manufacturing-90 percent. Scores of thousands of dif-
ferent materials and chemical substances constitute the hazardous residuals of these thir-
teen industries. DRAFT EIS, supra note 11, at V-42. 
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pand an off-site hazardous waste facility in any populated area is 
bound to provoke reaction and opposition. 
According to EPA, Subtitle C will rapidly and greatly enlarge 
the demand for environmentally adequate off-site hazardous 
waste facilities, with perhaps 25 percent of this nation's industrial 
hazardous wastes being sent off-site for treatment and disposal by 
1984.18 While there is no shortage of unsound waste sites, EPA 
maintains there is currently a shortage of environmentally suita-
ble off-site hazardous waste facilities.18 Although only 53 percent 
of the capacity of existing off-site facilities is currently used, EPA 
explains that all of the environmentally adequate off-site capacity 
would be far outdistanced by demand if the 90 percent of the 
hazardous waste formerly mismanaged were managed properly as 
Subtitle C commands. so EPA projects an acute shortfall in off-site 
hazardous waste service capacity by 1984 unless fifty to sixty new 
off-site facilities are built (including twenty landfills) and existing 
facilities are upgraded to meet Subtitle C standards and are uti-
lized at full capacity.s1 
Propelling the demand for more off-site hazardous waste facili-
ties is the growing generation of wastes. In general, industrial haz-
ardous waste generation is growing at a rate of 4 percent to 6 
.. [d. at VII-36 to 37. 
•• According to one EPA estimate, the 12 major hazardous waste generating industries 
in 1977 produced at least 46 million metric tons of hazardous waste, of which 7.9 million 
metric tons (about 15 percent) should have been disposed off-site for environmentally ade-
quate management. At that time EPA reported the environmentally adequate capacity for 
off-site disposal stood at 6.2 million metric tons, a capacity shortfall of about 1.7 million 
metric tons. The General Accounting Office believes this shortfall estimate substantially 
understates the deficit in environmentally adequate hazardous waste management capac-
ity. See GAO REPORT-How TO DISPOSE or HAZARDous WASTE, supra note 49, at 5-7; 
DRAFT EI8, supra note 11, at 8-35; see also note 61, infra. 
10 EPA DECISION-MAKER'S GUIDE, supra note 25, at 43. 
II See EPA DECISION-MAKER'S GUIDE, supra note 25, at 43; GAO REPORT-How TO DIS-
POSE or HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 49; DRAFT EI8, supra note 11, at 8-35. 
EPA predicts that by 1984 the off-site hazardous waste capacity deficit could increase 53 
percent to 2.6 million metric tons unleu at least 46 new off-site facilities are built. Even if 
sufficient capacity to properly handle hazardous waste off-site materializes nationally in 
the near future, localized shortfalls are likely. In New Jersey, Ohio, and Penn-
sylvania-respectively, the first, sixth, and seventh largest hazardous waste generating 
states nationally-the present off-site shortfall in environmentally adequate hazardous 
waste capacity probably considerably exceeds the national average. 80me states, like New 
York, have a sufficiently large geographic area to accommodate hazardous wastes, but for 
many hazardous waste generators this region lies outside a reasonable and economic dis-
tance for transporting their wastes. GAO REPoRT-How TO DISPOSE or HAZARDOUS WASTE, 
supra note 49, at 5-7; DRAFT EIS, supra note 11, at 8-35. 
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percent annually, although some industries are generating wastes 
at vastly greater rates of growth.82 Consequently, annual hazard-
ous waste generation can be expected to double in the next twelve 
to twenty-four years. Because on-site hazardous waste activities 
.2 EPA projects hazardous waste production to proceed at a 4 to 6 percent annual 
growth rate for the 14 major hazardous waste generating industry groupings, with overall 
hazardous waste growth experiencing a 48 percent increase for these industries over the 
ten-year period from 1974 to 1983. The table below shows that waste growth projections 
for 1974 to 1983 vary tremendously among these industries. 
HAZARDOUS WASTE GROWTH PROJECTIONS 
Industry 1974* 1983* % Increase 
Dry Wet Dry Wet '74-'83* 
1. Batteries 0.005 0.010 0.105 0.209 2000 
2. Inorganic 




and explosives 2.150 6.860 3.800 12.666 77 
4. Electro-
plating 0.909 5.276 1.751 5.260 92 
5. Paint and 
allied 
products 0.075 0.096 0.105 0.145 40 
6. Petroleum 
refining 0.625 1.757 0.811 1.888 30 
7. Pharmaceuticals 0.062 0.005 0.104 0.108 68 
8. Primary metals, 
smelting and 
refining 4.454 8.335 5.536 10.418 24 
9. Textile dye-
ing and 
finishing 0.048 1.770 0.179 0.716 373 
10. Leather 
tanning 0.045 0.146 0.068 0.214 51 
11. Special 
machinery 0.102 0.163 0.157 0.209 54 
12. Electric 
components 0.026 0.036 0.050 0.108 92 
13. Rubber and 
plastics 0.205 0.785 0.299 1.204 46 
14. Waste Oil 
refining 0.057 0.057 0.144 0.144 253 
Totals 10.763 28.755 15.909 38.089 48 
*Based on dry weight quantities per million metric tons 
Figures derived from table in EPA DECISION-MAKER'S GUIDE, supra note 25, at 14. See 
also notes 345-48 and accompanying text, infra, regarding the major contribution made by 
pollution control on industrial waste growth. 
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have always posed a greater risk to the public and environment 
due to their near universal mismanagement,63 EPA plans to give 
priority to enforcing Subtitle C standards against transgressing 
on-site facilities.6• EPA's enforcement emphasis against on-site 
facilities deliberately seeks to push more wastes to safer off-site 
facilities. 6& 
Subtitle C is expected to reverse the trend of recent years to-
ward increasing on-site hazardous waste disposal by removing the 
cost advantage it had over off-site treatment or disposal.66 Both 
on-site and off-site hazardous waste operations were grossly un-
derregulated in the past, but on-site operations were considerably 
less expensive because their regulation by the states was either 
nonexistent or extremely lax. Any regulation that did exist was 
primarily directed at off-site facilities. 67 Subtitle C's equally strin-
gent regulation of both kinds of facilities will in many cases turn 
the tables and confer a cost advantage on off-site hazardous waste 
management. Many industrial hazardous waste generators may 
find it less expensive to share with others the costs of off-site fa-
cilities by shipping their wastes to these facilities rather than 
bearing the expense of their own individual waste sites.6s Other 
factors69 influenced by Subtitle C which will shift more waste to 
off-site facilities include: the diminishing availability of land for 
on-site hazardous waste activities in urban areas, the expected re-
moval of large quantities of wastes previously disposed improp-
erly to off-site facilities as a precaution against future injury to 
people and the environment, and the designation by Subtitle C of 
many more wastes as hazardous because of Subtitle C. 
•• See note 55, supra . 
•• Michael A. Kilpatrick, a chemical engineer at EPA's Office of Enforcement, an-
nounced his agency's enforcement emphasis against on-site facilities in an April 3, 1979 
address to the Chemical Congress of the American Chemical Society in Honolulu. 9 ENVIR. 
REP. (BNA) 2295 (April 6, 1979) . 
•• Pushing more hazardous wastes off-site will gain the additional benefit of somewhat 
easing the regulatory load. The regulatory burden relaxes as more wastes can be concen-
trated at a relatively few large off-site facilities rather than disposed on the grounds of 
scores of thousands of factory waste sites . 
•• DRAFT EIS, supra note 11, at VII-33 . 
•• HOUSE REPORT ON HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL, supra note 37, at 26 . 
•• For instance, the American Paper Institute claims it would cost from $75,000 to 
$200,000 to provide impermeable liners up to Subtitle C standards for pulp and paper mill 
wastewater lagoons, and the cost of retrofitting an existing lagoon with an impermeable 
liner "could be astronomicaL" 10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 291 (June 22, 1979) . 
• 0 See DRAFT EIS, supra note ll, at VII-32 to VII-38, and GAO REPORT-How TO DIS-
POSE OF HAZARDOUS WASTES, supra note 49, at 9-10. 
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The greatly enlarged demand for more new, environmentally 
adequate, off-site hazardous waste facilities will be matched every 
step of the way by public opposition. Citizen opposition has al-
ready shut down existing hazardous waste and solid waste facili-
ties.70 The fear of bad publicity and the high costs of battling 
citizen opposition have even forced some facility proponents to 
abandon siting proposals at the first hint of local protest.71 
Subtitle C regulation not only generates greater public opposi-
tion by creating demand for new, additional off-site hazardous 
waste facilities but also has the distinction of actually facilitating 
opportunities for public opposition. EPA provides for public 
hearings in the issuance of permits for hazardous waste manage-
ment facilities.7l1 One Illinois official told the General Accounting 
Office that public hearings would force the closing of every haz-
ardous waste facility in the state, and another California official 
said hearings could lead to the closing of eight to ten existing fa-
cilities.78 RCRA, in fact, demands the incorporation of public par-
ticipation into all its programs, even though it could slow down 
and, in some instances, stop the siting of hazardous waste 
facilities.74 
The purpose of Subtitle C is to protect citizens from hazardous 
waste pollution.71 Protection of the public is not achieved by the 
mere existence of strict standards for hazardous waste facili-
ties-although these are a necessary element in any effort to 
achieve this end. In order to protect the public it is essential to 
afford citizens the means and a forum to protect themselves. This 
can be accomplished by full and consequential participation in 
the regulatory process, even though such public participation 
•• GAO REPORT-How TO DISPOSE or HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 49, at 14 . 
.. [d. at 9-10 . 
•• 45 Fed. Reg. 33290, 33485-492 (May 19, 1980) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 124.1-
124.21) . 
•• GAO REpORT-How To DISPOSE or HAZARDOUS WASTES, supra note 49, at 15 . 
•• RCRA § 7004 requires that public participation be "provided for, encouraged and 
assisted in the implementation of all the parts of RCRA by both EPA and the states." 42 
U.S.C. § 6974 (1976). 
•• Protection of the well-being of people and the environment from the adverse impacts 
of solid and hazardous wastes was a major congressional motivation in enacting RCRA and 
is represented in the findings of the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 6901(b)(I)-(6) (1976). In particu-
lar the statute justifies Subtitle C in the finding that "hazardous waste presents . . . spe-
cial dangers to health and requires a greater degree of regulation than does nonhazardous 
solid waste .... " 42 U.S.C. § 6901(b)(5) (1976). See also HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND 
FOREIGN COMMERCE, REpORT ON H.R. 14496, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976). 
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might at times infuse some inefficiency into that process. 
Yet, while public participation measures in hazardous waste 
control is highly desireable, it can be an obstacle to the expansion 
of hazardous waste facilities. Top EPA officials and many state 
environmental control officials and hazardous waste service indus-
try representatives single out public opposition as the only major 
barrier to the siting of more, needed off-site facilities.'11 They por-
tray as surmountable other technical, economic and environmen-
tal impediments to the implementation of Subtitle C. The boost-
ers of more waste facilities contend that if citizens succeed in 
killing most new hazardous waste facility sitings, they will also 
kill Subtitle C's primary objective, namely, to safeguard the pub-
lic and the environment against hazardous waste mismanagement 
by insuring that there are enough places where all hazardous 
waste can be properly cared for.'1'1 
B. Entrenched Public Opposition 
While Subtitle C may foster public opposition, such opposition 
may be unavoidable regardless of the severity or the nature of 
regulation for hazardous waste sites. Citizen anxiety and repug-
nance for hazardous waste sites appears largely entrenched and 
intransigent. '18 
O. The top EPA officials that have singled out public opposition to hazardous waste 
facility siting as the major barrier to the implementation of Subtitle C include Thomas 
Jorling, Assistant Administrator for Water and Waste Management; Gary Dietrich, Associ-
ate Deputy Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste; and Steffen Plehn, Deputy Assistant 
Administrator for Solid Waste. See testimony of Thomas Jorling, in House Subcommittee 
on Transportation and Commerce, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Oversight 
Hearings, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., at 12-16 (March 7-9, 1978) [hereinafter cited as House 
Subcomm. on Transportation and Commerce]; for reports of Dietrich and Plehn state-
ment on public opposition, see 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 2295-96 (April 6, 1979); 9 ENVIR. REP. 
(BNA) 2114-15 (March 3, 1979). 
00 In a statement at a House subcommittee hearing, Thomas Jorling, EPA Assistant 
Administrator, summarized the actions needed to implement Subtitle C and issued the 
following warning that public opposition stood in the way of achieving the statute's objec-
tive of public protection: 
All these actions will require new sites, yet no matter what type of solid waste facility 
is proposed, public opposition is dramatic, often strong· and well-organized. If we are 
not able to convince the American public that RCRA Mil ensure that disposal sites are 
safe and well managed, we will never acquire the needed and necessary sites for facili-
ties, and, therefore, never achieve the objectives of RCRA, namely protection of health 
and the environment, and resource recovery. I think it is clear that the siting issue is 
the most difficult problem facing us in the implementation of RCRA. 
House Subcomm. on Transportation and Commerce, supra note 76, at 15. 
o. See note 284, infra. 
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The two distinct types of public opposition to hazardous waste 
sites are: 1) site-specific resistance by citizens and local govern-
ments to facilities proposed in or near their communities; and 2) 
state laws or policies which either intentionally limit or have the 
unintentional effect of obstructing the development of off-site 
hazardous waste facilities. Local opposition generally consists of 
vocal and well-organized citizen protests and local government re-
jection of waste sites.79 State antagonism to waste sites comes in 
several forms. A few states had enacted bans on the importation 
of out-of-state wastes for treatment or disposal,80 but state waste 
import bans were invalidated when the U.S. Supreme Court 
struck down New Jersey's version in the City of Philadelphia v. 
New Jersey.81 The Supreme Court held that the New Jersey 
waste import ban violated the commerce clause of the U.S. Con-
stitution by unduly interfering with the free movement of wastes 
as an item of commerce. In Kentucky a new hazardous waste fa-
cility cannot obtain a state permit without the approval of both 
the legislature and the governor.82 Moreover, seeking a hazardous 
waste facility permit in Kentucky is a futile effort since appli-
cants must wait up to two years for the legislature to meet in its 
biennial session, and both the legislature and governor are likely 
to be reluctant to overrule local government rejection of a hazard-
ous waste facility.83 Connecticut allows local governments to for-
bid, through zoning, the siting of hazardous waste operations.84 
Although state regulation of hazardous waste overall has never 
been distinguished for its stringency, EPA has in the past ex-
pressed concern that "overregulation" in some states, such as 
waste import bans, statutory deference to local siting approval, 
etc., could intentionally or unintentionally discourage the opera-
tion of hazardous waste facilities in these states and thereby force 
wastes to move to other states where it is comparatively easier to 
78 See note 49, supra. 
8. Louisiana, Minnesota, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Vermont 
have enacted waste import bans, as reported in DRAFT EIS, supra note 11, at VII-42. No 
state has an export ban on hazardous waste, but EPA's Thomas Jorling has suggested such 
a measure would force communities to face the problem of siting hazardous waste facili-
ties. 10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 290 (June 22, 1979) . 
• , 437 U.S. 617 (1978) . 
•• Ky. REV. STAT. § 224.855(5) (1974) . 
•• [d . 
•• GAO REPORT-How TO DISPOSE OF HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 49, at 8. 
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site facilities.8& With Subtitle C Congress established a uniform. 
system of hazardous waste control throughout the nation. A ma-
jor reason for uniform national regulation was to equalize the eco-
nomic impact of regulation so that facilities can be sited where 
and when needed and to close off opportunities for improper haz-
ardous waste dumping in states with inadequate controls.86 While 
Subtitle C does not expressly prohibit states from adopting more 
stringent controls than those dictated by EPA because Congress 
was more concerned with state underregulation than overregula-
tion, it appears that state regulation would be void to the extent 
it unduly restricts the free movement of wastes in interstate com-
merce87 and undermines the uniform, national system of waste 
control which Subtitle C establishes and EPA implements. Subti-
tle C denies federal authorization to any state program which is 
not equivalent to that of the EPA or not consistent with both 
EPA and other state programs.88 
By encouraging and prodding states to bear the primary re-
sponsibility for administering hazardous waste control, Subtitle C 
dissolves state obstacles to facility siting and pits the states 
against local citizens opposing hazardous waste sites. In fact, state 
agencies which now have or will have jurisdiction over hazardous 
waste regulation under Subtitle C are among the strongest advo-
cates of measures to defeat local opposition to proposed hazard-
0us waste sites.89 
I. EPA DECISION-MAKER'S GUIDE, supra note 25, at 31. 
•• Overregulation of industrial waste treatment and dispoal which obstructs the free 
flow of wastes can have adverse economic impacts on the communities, states, or regions 
that maintain them. Often the location decisions of manufacturing industries which gener-
ate these hazardous wastes are influenced by the availability of waste sites. Blocking or 
impeding the disposal of waste in one geographic area favors other places without similar 
barriers but having similar merits. Consequently, overregulation can have a negative im-
pact on the local or regional economy which it affects and a positive impact on other com-
peting places lacking similar restraints on waste activities. The availability of waste sites, 
hazardous and non-hazardous, is increasingly becoming an important ingredient in indus-
trial siting decisions, joining the more traditional industrial site criteria such as the availa-
bility of adequate power, water, and labor. See generally, EPA DECISION-MAKER'S GUIDE, 
supra note 25, at 31. 
.7 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) . 
.. See RCRA § 3006(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (1976). EPA has defined consistency in its 
rules so as to bar federal approval of a state hazardous waste program if any aspect unrea-
sonably restricts the interstate movement of wastes to licensed hazardous waste facilities 
or if any aspect of state law or the state program prohibits hazardous waste facilities with-
out any basis in human health or environmental protection. 45 Fed. Reg. 33465-66 (May 
19, 1980) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. § 123.32(a), (b)) . 
•• At the December 4 and 5, 1978 International Conference on Hazardous Materials 
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The most frequent and fierce source of opposition to hazardous 
waste facilities are citizens and local governments in communities 
where the sites are proposed. County and city governments and 
their elected officials, reflecting citizen sentiment and responding 
to citizen pressure, fight hard, and frequently succeed in barring 
hazardous waste sites from their jurisdictions through zoning and 
other local regulations. The major proposals offered by federal 
and state regulatory officials for overcoming local opposition or 
for winning public support for hazardous waste facilities are: state 
site selection;90 the siting of hazardous waste facilities on public 
land (including the option of state operation of facilities);91 fed-
eral siting;92 remote siting;98 and education and information pro-
grams on hazardous waste.94 
1. State Site Selection 
Traditionally the task of finding a location for an off-site haz-
ardous waste facility has been left up to its proponent, usually a 
waste disposal or chemical processing firm and occasionally a mu-
nicipality. The state's role has generally been confined to review-
ing proposals for compliance with environmental and public 
safety standards and procedures prescribed by state statutes and 
regulations, if, and to the extent that, they existed or were seri-
ously invoked. The Subtitle C regulations do not deviate from the 
traditional site selection process, making no attempt to direct the 
geographic location of facilities.96 Many state officials and the 
EPA favor a more active state role in identifying sites for pri-
vately operated hazardous waste facilities.98 The major benefit at-
tributed to state site selection is that the identification of several 
environmentally, economically, and perhaps politically acceptable 
Management held in Detroit, several state and federal regulatory officials and waste man-
agement industry representatives attacked local citizen opposition, contending it was the 
major barrier to Subtitle C implementation. These regulatory officials and waste industry 
representatives advocated stronger state and federal measures for facilitating hazardous 
waste facility siting over local opposition. 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1406-07 (December 8, 
1978) . 
.. GAO REPORT-How TO DISPOSE OF HAZARDOUS WASTES, supra note 49, at 11-12 . 
.. Id . 
•• Id. at 42 . 
•• Id . 
.. Id. at 12, 16-17 . 
•• 45 FED. REG. 33220-58 (May 19, 1980) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 264, 265) . 
.. See notes 100, 117, supra. 
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sites advances hazardous waste facility development. State identi-
fication of sites gives facility proponents the added option of tak-
ing advantage of a ready-made, carefully selected list of accept-
able sites instead of having to endure the frequently costly 
process of struggling to find their own suitable sites. From a more 
opportunistic perspective state site selection is viewed by its state 
and federal supporters as a tool to gain public support for hazard-
ous waste siting by offering a better, more comprehensive means 
to discover suitable sites." EPA's proposed guidelines for state 
solid waste management plans recommend that these plans in-
clude hazardous waste site identification as one of its elements.98 
While the desirability of a state role in site identification is un-
mistakable, it does little to eliminate public opposition. For in-
stance, Minnesota learned that public opposition can be just as 
severe for state identification of technically suitable hazardous 
waste sites utilizing sophisticated and environmentally sensitive 
selection methods as for site selection by private industry.99 In 
1975 EPA awarded the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency a 
$3.7 million grant to conduct a five year demonstration project for 
state identification of suitable sites for a chemical waste landfill. 
Over a three year period the state identified sixteen sites, using 
impeccable environmental criteria. Fierce local opposition by citi-
zens and elected officials torpedoed each site proposal and with 
two years funding remaining on the grant, an exasperated Minne-
sota returned the remaining monies to EPA. 
2. Siting on Public Lands 
Closely related to state identification of hazardous waste sites is 
the idea of siting on state-owned land. Public land siting can also 
entail state operation of the facility,t°o operation by a private li-
censee, or the availability of both options.101 Eminent domain has 
17 GAO REPORT-How TO DISPOSE OF HAZARDOUS WASTES, supra note 49, at 11-12; 9 
ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1406-07 (Dec. 8, 1978) . 
•• GAO REPORT-How TO DISPOSE OF HAZARDOUS WASTES, supra note 49, at 15 . 
•• Id. at 13. See generally note 49, supra. 
100 For instance, Frank Beal, Director of the Illinois Institute of Natural Resources, rec-
ommended at a Chicago solid waste conference that the states legislate agency authority to 
select and administer landfill sites for all types of solid wastes, hazardous and non-hazardc 
ous. 8 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 81 (May 18, 1977). 
101 As of 1979, Oregon appeared to be the only state where a hazardous waste disposal 
I site must by law be owned by the state. If, prior to operation, the permitted site is not 
owned by Oregon, it must be deeded to the state by the private operator. OREGON REV. 
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also been recommended for the quick and assured capture of sites 
for private facilities and is usually presupposed an integral part of 
the public land siting option. l02 The justifications for public siting 
seem to be that it allows the prompt acquisition and development 
of sites when needed, provides a stronger state role in site care 
during and after operations, and, through the intermediary of 
state government, moves citizens closer to decisions about the 
proper management of hazardous waste sites. 
The rationales for public siting dissolve when public siting is 
scrutinized either as it has actually been practiced or alongside 
other regulatory measures which attain the same ends. The ulti-
mate in public land siting is the government owned and operated 
waste facility, yet this facility is just as prone to hazardous waste 
pollution catastrophe as any private facility sited on private or 
public land. A case in point is the hazardous waste disaster at the 
federally owned Rocky Mountain Arsenal near Denver. l03 Dis-
charges of industrial and military wastes at the arsenal have con-
taminated thirty square miles of underground water and EPA be-
lieves that merely to study the problem could cost up to $78 
million; the actual clean-up costs would be several times larger. 
From the perspective of Subtitle C control, public land siting pro-
vides neither greater nor lesser citizen power in the management 
of hazardous waste sites than does private land siting. No distinc-
tion between hazardous wastes facilities on public land and those 
on private land is made by Subtitle C or its draft regulations ei-
ther in the type of control or in the extent of public involvement 
in the regulation of the facilities. The only advantage possibly 
gained by public siting or eminent domain for hazardous waste 
facilities is a greater ease in securing sites.· Public ownership of 
hazardous waste sites, in itself, gives no assurance of greater se-
STAT. § 459.590 (1979). 
I.' Oregon law allows the state to condemn land for hazardous waste disposal sites, all 
of which must be owned by the state but will be operated by licensees. OREGON REV. STAT. 
§ 459.595 (1979). Maryland also permits the state to condemn hazlirdous waste sites, but 
apparently only those which have been closed, and only for the purpose of assuring the 
proper perpetual care of the idle site or protecting against any substantial threat to the 
public health or the environment. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 8-1412, 2(n) (Michie Supp. 
1979). Michigan, likewise, allows the state to acquire ownership of any closed waste site 
formerly licensed for the purpose of assuming the responsibility for long-term care of the 
site. Michigan Hazardous Waste Management Act, 1979 MICH. PUB. ACTS No. 64 (July 25, 
1979). 
,.a GAO REPORT-How TO DISPOSE OF HAZARDOUS WASTES, supra note 49, at 23-24. 
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curity against harm nor of diminished public opposition. 
EPA has not adopted a formal policy supporting or promoting 
the use of public land (federal, state or local) for the siting of 
hazardous waste facilities in any manner. Conspicuous in its ab-
sence is any provision in Subtitle C which even faintly refers to 
state or federal ownership of hazardous waste sites or facilities. 104 
The Subtitle C which Congress fashioned is firmly anchored to 
the long-held assumption that the private sector is competent to 
manage waste sites and the proper role of government is as a reg-
ulator not an owner or operator of waste sites. 1011 Whether private 
waste facility operators are in fact competent is another matter, 
but there is no reason to believe state government can do a better 
job of running hazardous waste sites. 
In the years leading up to Subtitle C's enactment EPA re-
mained true to the belief that the siting of hazardous waste facili-
ties on public land or the operation of facilities by government is 
unnecessary, provided strong regulation of private hazardous 
waste management could be maintained. EPA's philosophy favor-
ing privately sited hazardous waste management facilities was 
originally articulated in its first major report on hazardous waste 
to Congress which the Agency submitted in 1973 and which heav-
ily influenced the final shape Congress gave Subtitle C.I08 Section 
212 of the now defunct Resource Recovery Act of 1970107 directed 
the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare (HEW) to submit to Congress a report evaluating the feasi-
bility of a system of nationally owned hazardous waste facilities. 
Created after the passage of the Act, EPA completed the 212 re-
port in the place of HEW and recommended that Congress em-
phasize regulatory strategies rather than create a nationalized 
system of hazardous waste facilities. lOS In a later report written to 
assist the states in their development of Subtitle C hazardous 
'04 [d. at 15-16. EPA haa only promoted state hazardous waate site or facility ownership 
insofar aa to recommend it be considered in state solid waste management plans when 
there is an imminent shortage of treatment and disposal facilities in an area . 
• oa EPA Assistant Administrator Thomaa C. Jorling haa said that the regulatory frame-
work of Subtitle C "assumes that private industry and private capital will produce facili-
ties that will comply with the hazardous waate regulations. EPA believes that this reliance 
on the private sector is desirable and appropriate." House Subcomm. on Transportation 
and Commerce, supra note 76, at 15. 
... See note 4, supra. 
'07 Pub. L. No. 91-512, 84 Stat. 1227 (Oct. 26, 1979) . 
• oa EPA DECISION-MAKER'S GUIDE, supra note 25, at 39-40. 
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waste programs EPA advised against siting hazardous waste facil-
ities on federal land/o9 but its arguments apply equally well to 
state land. Specifically, the report questioned the necessity and 
wisdom of public land siting, emphatically declaring that reliable 
hazardous waste management was readily achievable through 
stringently regulated private facilities, and that public land siting 
solved neither the problem of long-term security nor that of pub-
lic opposition to hazardous waste sites.llo The EPA report ex-
plained that the strict regulation of hazardous waste demanded 
by Subtitle C would give birth to a thriving business for the pri-
vate hazardous waste service industry and that providing public 
land for private waste facilities would be an undeserved bonus or 
subsidy.l11 The report concluded that Subtitle C's existence was 
ample incentive to the hazardous waste service industry to build 
needed facilities and that offering government land for these 
businesses would be inequitable because it would shift to the 
public much of the costs of hazardous waste management RCRA 
meant to be borne by the producers and consumers of goods and 
services generating hazardous wastes. 112 An EPA report to the 
states, like the previous section 212 report, declared that public 
siting of hazardous waste facilities was only justifiable when all 
efforts to site a private facility proved futile. 113 
A further windfall accrues to the private hazardous waste ser-
vice industry when both it and the state are engaged in operating 
hazardous waste facilities. In Indiana both industrial hazardous 
waste generators and the hazardous waste facility operators have 
urged legislators to give the state the authority to operate hazard-






114 The Indiana General Assembly's Solid Waste Management Study Commission has 
drafted a hazardous waste management bill which includes a provision establishing a com-
mission with the authority to construct hazardous waste facilities in the state, and author-
izing the Indiana Department of Natural Resources to operate any such facility. Solid 
Waste Management Study Commission of the Indiana General Assembly bill draft 80PD6. 
The author discussed the motivations behind support for state-operated hazardous waste 
facilities of both industrial waste generators and the waste management firms in Indiana 
during a telephone interview with Patrick Haynes, Commission Counsel, Solid Waste 
Management Study Commission of the Indiana General Assembly, Indianapolis, July 18, 
1979. 
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concentrate on the treatment and disposal of those hazardous 
wastes posing manageable and relatively modest risks while leav-
ing the state with the responsibility and risks of maintaining 
landfills for the untreatable and the most perilous hazardous 
wastes. IlIl Industrial hazardous waste generators fear that unless 
the State enters the hazardous waste business they will have no 
place to discard the worst of their hazardous wastes. 118 
The siting of waste facilities, hazardous and nonhazardous, is a 
land-use decision and traditionally the final say on siting has 
been left up to localities through zoning and building controls, as 
is the case with the control of most land use activities in Ameri-
can communities. Federal and state gQvernments in the past have 
not attempted to interfere with the long-established local prerog-
ative in the siting of waste facilities, but the explosive demand for 
new sites, the growing local resistance to these sites, and the 
newly imposed obligation for strong solid waste and hazardous 
waste regulation conferred upon state and federal governments all 
combine to soften federal and state deference toward the local 
land use prerogative in siting approval. 117 State or federal pre-
emption is the most direct means to override local authority and 
has gained serious consideration which was unheard of before the 
enactment of Subtitle C.Il8 The rationale offered for preemption 
is that state or federal agencies are less vulnerable to local politi-
cal pressure and can therefore better dispassionately judge the 
11O [d . 
.. 6 [d. 
117 Several top EPA officials have expressed an aversion to a significant federal role in 
hazardous waste facility siting, or at least recognized the improbability of its occurence, 
although they have encouraged a much stronger state role. Steffen Plehn, EPA Deputy 
Assistant Administrator, states that the choice of a hazardous waste site "is not one which 
the federal government can contribute to. This is something the states have got to do." 
Plehn advised that it might be necessary for some states to preempt local zoning laws. 10 
ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 29 (May 4, 1979). In an address before the International Hazardous 
Material Management Conference held in Detroit on December 4-5, 1978, EPA Assistant 
Administrator Thomas Jorling told the participants not to hope for federal siting, declar-
ing, as an example, that past federal attempts to site power plants have failed. 9 ENVIR. 
REP. (BNA) 1406-07 (Dec. 8, 1978). EPA has informed the GAO that it would pay in-
creased attention to hazardous waste siting problems, but EPA said it had to "stress the 
restraints on a more active federal involvement that are presented by the long tradition of 
state and local rights and responsibilities for land-use planning." GAO REPORT-How TO 
DISPOSE OF HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 49, at 22. 
116 Gary Dietrich, EPA's Assistant Deputy Administrator, told the Chemical Congress of 
the American Chemical Society on April 2, 1979, that state or federal override of local 
authority may sometimes be warranted to obtain needed hazardous waste sites. 9 ENVIR. 
REP. (BNA) 2299 (April 6, 1979). 
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public necessity and technological adequacy of a proposed haz-
ardous waste site.119 
Though preemption is an effective weapon for vanquishing 
public opposition to hazardous waste sites, it has several draw-
backs. In the first place, preemption certainly does not win com-
munity support for a waste site but instead simply leapfrogs over 
or steamrolls public opposition. State preemption presumes local 
governments cannot be worked with as sensible partners in siting 
hazardous wastes facilities but rather are to be viewed as obstruc-
tions. Still, the mere existence of state preemptive authority does 
not mean it will actually be used to defeat local opposition to a .. 
proposed hazardous waste site. A 1978 General Accounting Office 
report discovered three states with preemptive authority for-haz-
ardous waste siting but no cases where this authority was exer-
cised.lI0 The rare use of preemptive authority for hazardous waste 
siting is representative of the firmly established unwillingness on 
the part of state agencies to overrule local land use decisions. In 
addition, local governments and their elected officials can utilize 
their political influence with state elected officials and agency 
heads to abort the exercise of state preemptive authority or emi-
nent domain for waste sites. 
3. Federal Siting 
Federal siting of hazardous waste facilities-be it in the shape 
of site identification, federally owned sites, or both-does not ap-
pear likely in the near future. In its section 212 report to Con-
gress,l21 EPA rejected nationalized hazardous waste sites.122 At 
the December 1978 International Conference on Hazardous 
Waste Management in Detroit, EPA Assistant Administrator 
Thomas Jorling remarked that past federal attempts to site 
power plants and landfills were failures and that the states cannot 
expect a federal siting role in hazardous waste activities. lZ3 
110 GAO REPORT-How TO DISPOSE OF HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 49, at 12. 
110 [d. See, for example, the Michigan Hazardous Waste Management Act, under which 
no local ordinance, permit requirement, or other requirement can prohibit the construc-
tion of a hazardous waste facility that has received a state permit. 1979 MICH. PUB. ACTS 
No. 64 § 21(1) (July 25, 1979). 
,., EPA REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 4. 
'" As reported in EPA DECISION-MAKER'S GUIDE, supra note 25, at 39. 
m 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1406-07 (Dec. 8, 1978). 
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4. Remote Siting 
Generally, the remote siting of hazardous waste facilities in ru-
ral areas of a state or in the desolate plains, deserts and range-
lands of the West is not economically feasible. 124 The cost and 
risks of hazardous waste transportation increase substantially 
with distance and therefore most new or expanded waste facilities 
must be located near the urban, industrialized areas where most 
of the waste is generated. In order to be economically feasible, 
off-site hazardous waste facilities require large waste volumes, 
and thus the logical facility location is in or near the industrial 
areas where virtually all the hazardous wastes are generated. 
Moreover, because citizen opposition does not discriminate on the 
basis of where hazardous waste originates, one should not be sur-
prised to encounter protests from citizens living or working near a 
site proposed to receive wastes exiled from some distant place.1211 
5. Education and Information Programs 
EP A is trying to educate and inform the public regarding the 
safety and necessity of hazardous waste facilities in hopes of win-
ning greater public acceptance of hazardous waste sites. EPA 
views the very creation and implementation of Subtitle C as play-
ing a major role in this public education process.1I6 EPA expects 
Subtitle C initially to heighten public awareness of the problems 
of hazardous waste and thereby to fuel public opposition to the 
local siting of hazardous waste facilities.127 However, EPA main-
tains that in the long run the presence of a more effective hazard-
ous waste control program, one in which the public can play an 
active role, could lessen public opposition by demonstrating to 
citizens that safe hazardous waste management is achievable.12s 
Toward this end EPA hopes further to enlighten the public about 
the safety and necessity of hazardous waste siting through a pub-
lic education and information campaign. Nonetheless EPA's in-
vestment in public education has so far been parsimonious. From 
.. < See EPA DECISION· MAKER'S GUIDE, supra note 25, at 41. 
... Id. Citizens can be especially hostile when their cOIr..munity becomes the dumping 
ground for wastes generated somewhere else. For instance, the protests of residents living 
near a privately owned landfill in Ohio stopped disposal there of municipal wastes shipped 
all the way from Montgomery County, Maryland . 
.. 8 DRAFT EI8, supra note 11, at V -34. 
mId. at 8-34. 
"·Id. 
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1975 through 1978 EPA spent only about $300,000 to inform the 
entire nation about hazardous waste control.129 In 1979 EPA 
awarded a $350,000 grant to six public health and environmental 
organizations to conduct a four-year national public awareness 
campaign on hazardous waste issues. 180 
EPA does not really appear to have much faith in the inherent 
educational value of Subtitle C nor in the effectiveness of more 
direct public education and information campaigns to sway com-
munities toward accepting hazardous waste facilities. While it is 
easy to convince the general public that more waste sites are 
needed to properly control hazardous wastes, to convince a com-
munity to actually accept a hazardous waste facility is entirely a 
different matter. According to EPA's Steffen Plehn this distinc-
tion is the "social dilemma" of hazardous waste siting in that 
"[E]veryone in this society wants hazardous waste managed prop-
erly and almost everyone in society would rather that it was not 
near them. "181 To date, the small sums EPA has directed towards 
public education and information programs on hazardous waste 
issues underscores the agency's low regard for this approach for 
convincing citizens to accept hazardous waste facilities. 
According to a GAO report, past experience in the siting of haz-
ardous waste facilities suggests that while in some instances one 
or more of the major measures proposed or used for overcoming 
or pacifying public opposition may work, none has been shown to 
be universally successful.l81 
c. Public Opposition-Justified By Meager Funds 
For Regulation 
The time-worn admonition, "they have nobody to blame but 
themselves," rings true for the difficulty state and federal govern-
ments are encountering in building hazardous waste facilities. 
Federal and state officials who charge that citizen opposition is 
the greatest or only major obstacle to implementing Subtitle C 
are, by negative implication, downplaying several other serious 
, •• GAO REpORT-How TO DISPOSE or HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 49, at 16 . 
.. 0 The campaign has been titled "Waste Alert" and is being conducted as a joint effort 
by the National Wildlife Federation, American Public Health Association, Environmental 
Action Foundation, League of Women Voters Education Fund, Technical Information 
Project, and the Izaak Walton League. 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 2038 (March 2, 1979). 
U1 9 ENVIR. REp. (BNA) 1603 (Dec. 28, 1978) . 
... GAO REpORT-How TO DISPOSE or HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 49, at 13. 
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problems which accompany this new control program. Most of 
these problems originate from within rather than from outside 
federal and state governments. 
Some state officials connected with regulating hazardous waste 
facilities characterize citizens who oppose sites as ignorant about 
the safety and security of the new, tightly regulated hazardous 
waste facilities of today.133 According to one top EPA official, the 
philosophy of Subtitle C regulation is 100 percent protection of 
the public and environment in the control of hazardous waste fa-
cilities.184 However, other EPA and state officials concede this 
cloud-touching goal may not always be attainable. One state offi-
cial declares that hazardous waste treatment and disposal activi-
ties are inherently dangerous, even when highly regulated and 
utilizing the latest technology.l3Ii Most EPA decision makers ap-
pear to view Subtitle C more realistically, not promising absolute 
safety for hazardous waste facilities but recognizing that Subtitle 
C's main point is to eradicate the uncontrolled and improper haz-
ardous waste practices that have caused nearly all the past inci-
dents of harm and to replace them with proper management 
practices.136 As long as hazardous waste facilities remain inher-
ently dangerous, citizens are prudent in retaining some measure 
of apprehension toward even the best regulated, built, and oper-
ated hazardous waste facilities. 
1. Inadequate Financial Support 
Establishing and maintaining the national program incarnated 
in Subtitle C to control hazardous waste is a huge undertaking, 
one which can only be satisfactorily carried out with adequate 
financial support. Subtitle C regulation for state and federal gov-
ernments encompasses overseeing up to 760,000 hazardous waste 
... Beatrice Tylutki, Director of New Jersey's Solid Waste Administration, is one top 
state regulatory official who has said citizen opposition is based on ignorance about the 
safety and security of new control measures and new facilities for hazardous wastes. 9 
ENvIR. REP. (BNA) 1406-07 (Dec. 8, 1978). 
". The contention that Subtitle C control seeks absolute environmental protection has 
been made by Gary Dietrich, EPA Associate Deputy Assistant Administrator. 10 ENvIR. 
REP. (BNA) 531 (June 29, 1979). 
I •• Statement of Glenn Paulson, Assistant Commissioner of the New Jersey Department 
of Environmental Conservation, in House Subcomm. on Transportation and Commerce, 
RCRA Oversight Hearings, supra note 76, at 139. 
I •• See, for example, the testimony of Steffen Plehn in House Subcomm on Transporta-
tion and Commerce, RCRA Oversight Hearings, supra note 76, at 112-24. 
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generators, granting and monitoring 29,000 hazardous waste facil-
ity permits, maintaining and reviewing the over 800,000 annual 
reports from both hazardous waste generators and service facili-
ties, and, by 1985, keeping tabs on the 690,000 yearly shipments 
of hazardous wastes.137 A Congressional report has sharply criti-
cized EPA for starving Subtitle C of necessary funds during its 
initial three-year authorization,138 and according to a GAO report, 
unless assured adequate funding over the long-term is made 
available to EPA and state regulatory authorities, the Subtitle C 
program cannot succeed.189 In this case local opposition to waste 
sites is a moot issue. For Subtitle C to work, adequate funding 
must be available to the federal government to carry out its ad-
ministrative responsibilities, aid states in developing their pro-
grams, and administer federal control programs in states without 
authorized programs.140 The states as well must provide the long-
term financial security and self-support needed to maintain their 
own hazardous waste control programs. Therefore, the most for-
midable obstacle to effective regulation of hazardous waste con-
trol is not citizen opposition. It is, rather, the questionable availa-
bility of adequate funding to provide Subtitle C regulation with a 
healthy start and effectively sustain it for years to come. 
Recognizing that the states will need financial assistance in de-
veloping their hazardous waste programs and to stimulate adop-
tion of federally authorized programs, Congress set aside $50 mil-
lion in grants for state program development to be equally 
divided in fiscal years 1978 and 1979.141 In contrast, as part of its 
policy of reducing federal spending whenever possible, the Carter 
Administration did not request from Congress any of the Subtitle 
C state grant funds authorized for fiscal year 1978.142 Instead, 
EPA diverted $3.4 million for this purpose from its Subtitle D 
appropriation which Congress had originally intended to be used 
lB. DRAFt' EIS, supra note 11, at S-19 to S-20. 
'08 HOUSE REPORT ON HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL, supra note 37, at 35-38. 
ta. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT 
PROGRAM WILL NOT BE EFFECTIVE: GREATER EFFORTS ARE NEEDED (Jan. 23, 1979) [herein-
after cited 88 COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES]. This GAO report is an excel-
lent review of the underfunding and understaffing problems that have severely disabled 
the development and implementation of Subtitle C control programs. 
'4. [d. at 1, 4, 11-12. 
'4' RCRA § 3011, 42 U.S.C. ~ 6931 (1976). 
'4' COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 139, at 15. 
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for development of state and regional solid waste plans. l4S For 
fiscal year 1979 the Administration requested an appropriation 
for state Subtitle C grants of $15 million, utilizing in total only 30 
percent of all the funds Congress had originally authorized for 
grant to states in order to help them develop their hazardous 
waste programs. 144 
The Administration's parsimony toward Subtitle C funding for 
state grants was the work of the President's Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (OMB), which likewise convinced the White 
House to curtail funds for EPA's administration of its own Subti-
tle C responsibilities.l41 During fiscal year 1978 EPA spent less 
than $200,000 on the hazardous waste operations of its ten re-
gional offices,148 and they informed GAO that in the immediate 
future it would be impossible for them to satisfactorily carry out 
critical program activities such as inspecting sites, surveilling the 
transportation and disposal of hazardous wastes, and monitoring 
state permit programs.147 For fiscal year 1978 EPA sought ap-
proval from OMB for $14,450,000 and 195 staff positions in order 
to properly administer Subtitle C.148 In arriving at the Adminis-
tration's final appropriation request to Congress, OMB cut by 
two-thirds EPA's recommendation, asking for only forty-eight 
staff positions and $5,068,OOO-an amount significantly less than 
the minimum $11.4 million authorized by the Act.148 Congress im-
proved slightly the Administration's OMB-determined request by 
approving an additional $40,000 and six positions for EPA admin-
istration of Subtitle C.1II0 
Although federal funding for Subtitle C has been inadequate, 
state funding of hazardous waste control has been far worse. The 
past laxity in state regulation of hazardous waste which provoked 
Congress to enact Subtitle C, resulted primarily from insufficient 
H. 2ND ANNUAL RCRA REPORT, supra note 8, at 1-24. 
H. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 139, at 15 . 
••• [d. 
H' [d . 
•• , [d. at 11-12. 
H. [d. at 15. 
••• RCRA originally authorized $38,000,000 for EPA administration of the Act for fiscal 
year 1978. RCRA § 2006(a). The Act directed that not less than thirty percent of the 
amount appropriated under subsection (c) be used exclusively for EPA's Subtitle C regula-
tory duties. RCRA § 2006(c); 42 U.S.C. § 6916(a) (1976). 
no COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 139, at 15. 
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state funding. lII1 A recent GAO report found that the states con-
tinue to shortchange their hazardous waste programs 
financially.162 GAO contacted twenty-six states and found that to-
gether these states in 1978 needed 594 positions in order to im-
plement Subtitle C properly. The states, however, assigned only 
180 persons to hazardous waste control programs and were $9.3 
million short of adequate funding for these programs. 163 
The financial deprivation suffered by federal and state hazard-
0us waste programs creates serious and debilitating complications 
for present and future Subtitle C control. Due to inadequate 
funding, EPA has been unable to provide the necessary technical 
assistance and proper supervision for the development and ad-
ministration of state hazardous waste programs. 164 Moreover, 
without federal financial assistance, states have been reluctant, 
slow, or simply unable to develop proper hazardous waste 
programs.lII6 
Sparse EPA funding harms the implementation of state pro-
grams as well. During RCRA's initial three-year authorization, 
EPA lacked the necessary funds and staff,168 to provide assistance 
for state program implementation, to review and monitor the con-
tinuing adequacy of state programs, and to be assured that it 
could, in the future, take over control of hazardous waste regula-
tion in those states with poor programs or which were unable or 
unwilling to adopt authorized programs. 
Subtitle C's financial impoverishment is part of a severe predic-
ament. Many states have implied or outright declared that with-
out substantial federal funding for the development and on-going 
implementation of their Subtitle C programs they would be un-
willing or unable to adopt authorized programs and instead would 
leave EPA with the regulatory responsibility within their bor-
ders.lII7 Of the twenty-six states GAO contacted, at least sixteen 
indicated an unwillingness to adopt hazardous waste programs 
,., Id. 
'··Id. 
, .. Id. at 16. 
, .. Id. at 1, 4, 11·12. 
, .. Id. at 15·16. 
, .. In 1979, of 11,000 EPA employees, a mere 160 were assigned to the hazardous waste 
and solid waste activities of the agency at its Washington, D.C. headquarters and ten reo 
gional offices. Only $25.2 million of the agency's $1.2 billion budget was directly or indio 
rectly devoted to the hazardous waste program. 10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 75 (May 18, 1979) . 
... COMPTROLLER GENERAL or THE UNITED STATES, supra note 139, at 16. 
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unless a large share of program administration costs were borne 
by the federal government. IN Four of the states (Indiana, New 
York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania) account for approximately one-
quarter of the nation's hazardous waste generation. us In 1978 
EPA regional officials told GAO that they lacked the funds and 
staff to administer hazardous waste regulation in any of twenty 
states which are not expected to apply or qualify to run their own 
programs. ISO Even those few states that have maintained rela-
tively good hazardous waste programs prior to the passage of 
Subtitle C claim there is a need for continuous, ample, federal 
funding to support their regulatory programs-California is a 
prime example. California is a pioneer in hazardous waste regula-
tion, possessing possibly the best program in the nation before 
RCRA was enacted. lSI However, in early 1978 the California De-
partment of Health warned a Senate subcommittee that the effec-
tiveness and long-term acceptance of its hazardous waste program 
would be seriously jeopardized without lasting federal financial 
support. lSI The California program could not have sustained itself 
up until now had it not received one-half of its financial support 
during its formative years from the federal government.ISa More-
over, California maintains that without federal financial assis-
tance it cannot upgrade and maintain its effective control pro-
gram in accordance with the even better standards Subtitle C 
requires. 184 
Sta~s generally seem disinclined to provide the substantial 
funding necessary to properly build and maintain authorized haz-
ardous waste control programs. Instead states expect and demand 
federal assistance to absorb a large part of the expense. lSI Con-
gress originally intended that the states carry the lion's share of 
the funding for the operation and enforcement of their hazardous 
... [d. 
II. [d. at 23 . 
... [d. at 16. 
... Calif. Hazardous Control Law (added by 1972 Cal. Stats., Ch. 1236, amended by 
1977 Cal. Stats., Ch. 1039), CALIF. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25100-25600.5 (West Supp. 
1980). 
II. Senate Subcommittee- on Resource Protection, Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act Oversight Hearings, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., at 188-95 (March 20, 1978) [hereinafter 
cited as SENATE RCRA OVERSIGHT HEARINGS] . 
••• [d. at 91-92 . 
... [d. at 92 . 
... COMPTROLLER GENERAL or THE UNITED STATES, supra note 139, at 15. 
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waste control programs when Congress did not authorize grant as-
sistance for this purpose. However, in authorizing $50 million in 
grants to help states develop hazardous waste programs, Congress 
apparently intended that a large share of the cost for creating 
state programs be borne by the federal government in order to get 
Subtitle C regulation off to a quick start.166 By greatly reducing 
the federal funds available to the states for program development, 
the executive branch has not only deprived the states of a decent 
beginning for hazardous waste control but has given them a good 
reason to avoid accepting full financial responsibility for their 
hazardous waste control programs. One state that has seriously 
considered not adopting its own hazardous waste control program 
is Pennsylvania, which indicated it was reluctant to follow the 
federal lead in implementing Subtitle C because it sees sparse 
federal funding of state program development as evidence of a 
lack of sincere federal concern and commitment to hazardous 
waste control.167 Like EPA, state environmental protection agen-
cies such as the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Re-
sources face tight and sometimes diminishing budgets for their 
existing programs, including non-hazardous solid waste manage-
ment.168 State legislatures which are tightening the budgets for 
existing environmental programs are obviously reluctant to ap-
propriate additional funds for new state environmental protection 
programs such as Subtitle C regulation. Many state officials and 
legislators regard Subtitle C regulation as just another federally 
imposed enviornmental protection program, and believe that the 
federal government, not the states, should provide a large share of 
the funds states will need to operate their own programs. 189 
In slowing the development of Federal and state Subtitle C reg-
ulatory programs, inadequate funding is at least as responsible as 
citizen opposition for the current and anticipated shortfall in en-
vironmental hazardous waste facility capacity. As a result of in-
sufficient funding, and the complexity of developing hazardous 
waste regulations which EPA should have foreseen, the Subtitle C 
regulations were not promulgated until slightly more than two 
... RCRA § 3011, 42 U.S.C. § 6931 (1976) . 
.. , Pennsylvania's problems in adopting a Subtitle C program were described by Penn-
sylvania Congressman Robert Edgar in testimony at the Senate ReRA Oversight Hear-
ings, supra note 162, at 5-11 . 
• 11 [d. at 6 . 
... COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 139, at 15. 
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years after the April 21, 1978 deadline Congress first fixed for 
their formulation. l7O Some states have enacted comprehensive 
hazardous waste control legislation recently as the first step in 
building their own Subtitle C programs.l7l No state can really be-
gin fully to develop and implement regulatory programs, however, 
until EPA's own belated regulatory scheme is finally and firmly in 
place and adequately funded, and until sufficient funds are made 
available for state program development. Eugene J. Wingerter, 
executive director of the National Solid Waste Management Asso-
ciation, points out that any delay in implementing the Subtitle C 
program also delays the development of new, environmentally ac-
ceptable waste facilities.172 Wingerter noted that until Subtitle C 
regulation is actually in place and enforced, there is no reason for 
hazardous waste generators to pay the high cost of proper treat-
ment and disposal required by Subtitle C regulation.173 
Worse yet, EPA Assistant Administrator Thomas Jorling told a 
Senate Committee in early 1979 that due to staff shortages and 
enormous paperwork unless the Agency receives substantially 
170 Virtually all of Subtitle C's regulations were required to be promulgated within 18 
months after the October 21, 1976 enactment of RCRA and to take effect 6 months after 
their promulgation. See RCRA §§ 3001-3006, 3010; 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6926, 6030 (1976). 
Thus, April 21, 1978 was the deadline for issuing the Subtitle C regulations, and October 
21, 1978 was the deadline for their taking effect. When EPA was unable to meet the April 
21, 1978 promulgation deadline, it was sued on September 7, 1978 by several environmf'n-
tal groups, a solid waste trade association, and the State of Illinois. The U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia ruled EPA, though not able to meet statutory dead-
lines, was making a "good faith" effort to issue regulations in a timely manner. State of 
Illinois v. Costle, No. 78-1689 (D.D.C., Jan. 13, 1979). On January 3, 1979, the district 
court issued a compliance schedule for the promulgation of the Subtitle C regulations, 
which was nearly identical to EPA's own suggested schedule. The court set a December 31, 
1979 deadline for the issuance of final regulations under sections 3001 through 3004 of 
Subtitle C, and an October 31, 1979 deadline for the promulgation of final rules under 
sections 3005 and 3006. On June I, 1979, EPA filed an affidavit with the District Court of 
the District of Columbia declaring it was certain that it could not conform with the court's 
compliance schedule and announced instead that all the final regulations would probably 
be promulgated sometime in March, 1980, rather than on or before December 31, 1979. 
EPA Administrator Douglas Costle indicated EPA would make every effort to comply with 
the court-ordered deadlines, but was not optimistic that it actually could do so. See 10 
ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 227-28 (June 15, 1979), and 653-54 (July 13, 1979). The court order 
was subsequently modified to require EPA to meet a promulgation date of April, 1980. 45 
Fed. Reg. 33086 (May 19, 1980). See notes 6 and 7, supra, for EPA rules issued pursuant 
to Subtitle C of RCRA. 
171 See, for example, the new Michigan Hazardous Waste Management Act, 1979 MICH. 
PUB. ACTS No. 64 (July 25, 1979). 
'72 GAO REPORT-How TO DISPOSE OF HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 49, at 4 . 
• 7. [d. 
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more funds it will take up to ten, instead of the expected five, 
years to issue permits for all the hazardous waste facilities operat-
ing or needed in the next few years. 174 
Jorling's warning of protracted delay in the implementation of 
Subtitle C due to underfunding has already started to unfold with 
EPA's promulgation of the regulations for hazardous waste facili-
ties.l76 When EPA issued proposed regulations for hazardous 
waste facilities on December 18, 1978,176 it was understood that 
the next set of regulations would soon be forthcoming and would 
be a complete and conclusive version of the concept presented in 
the proposed draft regulations.177 Despite issuing the proposed 
regulations eight months after the deadline for the final regula-
tions,178 and a federal court order setting April 1980 as the dead-
line for fully and finally issuing Subtitle C regulations,179 EPA's 
most current version of the regulations for hazardous waste facili-
ties is rudimentary and preliminary .180 EPA blames limited re-
sources for its failure to complete once and for all a control pro-
gram for hazardous waste facilities. 181 Whatever justifications 
EPA offers for failing to complete a definitive control program for 
hazardous waste facilities, the public and the environment will 
merely be minimally protected for a period of several years 
against the risks of pollution by hazardous waste facilities. An op-
timistic characterization of EPA's latest version of regulations for 
hazardous waste facilities is that some control is better than none. 
174 Testimony of Thomas Joriing, reported in 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 2250 (March 30, 
1979). 
17. See generally, 45 Fed. Reg. 33154-258 (May 19, 1980) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. §§ 
264 and 265). 
17' 43 Fed. Reg. 58946-59022 (Dec. 18, 1978). 
177 EPA's proposed regulations provided for two tiers of performance standards for haz-
ardous waste facilities. The first. basic level consisted of specific standards for the design, 
construction and operation of various types of hazardous waste facilities. On top of these 
specific design and operation standards, the draft regulations contained overriding human 
health and environmental performance standards for protecting ground water, surface 
water, and air quality. Compliance with the overriding human health and environmental 
standards was to be generally assumed for facilities built and operated in accordance with 
the specific design and operation standards, but in those presumably few situations where 
the design and operation standards failed to satisfactorily protect health and the environ-
ment, then the overriding standards would supersede them and provide the regulatory 
authority for ordering more stringent facility standards. See generally, 43 Fed. Reg. 58946, 
58990-59015 (Dec. 18, 1978). 
17. See note 170, supra. 
17. [d. 
110 45 Fed. Reg. 33220-58 (May 19, 1980) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. §§ 264, 265). 
111 45 Fed. Reg. 33157 (May 19, 1980). 
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The Agency has made complicated what would have been sim-
pler had one definitive set of regulations been issued. EPA's latest 
set of regulations for hazardous waste facilities constitutes the 
first and most elementary stage of a three-phase program EPA 
promises to complete.182 According to EPA the first phase of its 
regulations represent a "bare outline" of those forthcoming in the 
last two stages.183 The first phase rules for hazardous waste facili-
ties consist of two types of regulations that are categorized as in-
terim status standardsl84 and general status standards. m In addi-
tion, the rules for hazardous waste facilities distinguish between 
the "interim final" provisions which constitute most of the regu-
lations and the tautological "final final" regulations.18s The in-
terim status standards introduced in the Phase I regulations 
cover currently operating hazardous waste facilities in existence 
prior to RCRA's enactment and pertain to any such facility be-
tween the time it applies for a permit and the time that the regu-
latory authority makes a final decision on the permit.187 The gen-
eral status standards contained in the Phase I regulations are 
independently enforceable standards which will be used to issue 
permits and which will apply to facilities once they have received 
a permit.188 Both types of standards are essentially identical for 
administrative and nontechnical requirements governing opera-
tions at hazardous waste facilities. 189 The differences in the Phase 
I regulations are that very few technical design and operation 
standards for environmental and public health protection are 
specified in the interim status standards while the general status 
standards specify virtually none.190 Despite having nearly four 
182 45 Fed. Reg. 33156-57 (May 19, 1980). 
183 45 Fed. Reg. 33157 (May 19, 1980). 
184 45 Fed. Reg. 33232-58 (May 19, 1980) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. § 265). 
18. 45 Fed. Reg. 33221-32 (May 19, 1980) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. § 264). 
188 Most of the sections of the regulations had been substantially modified from the 
draft regulations, and therefore they were issued as interim final regulations so that fur-
ther public comment could be received before they were promulgated as "final regula-
tions." 45 Fed. Reg. 33157 (May 19, 1980). 
187 Section 3005(e) of RCRA provides that, if the owners or operators of a facility which 
is in existence on October 21, 1976 (the date of enactment of RCRA) notify EPA and 
properly applies for n permit, then the owner or operator is 1'0 be "treated as having been 
issued such a permit." EPA refers to such an owner or operator as having "interim status" 
because that is the title of subsection 3005(e). 42 U.S.C. § 6925(e) (1976). 
188 45 Fed. Reg. 33157 (May 19, 1980). 
189 45 Fed. Reg. 33156 (May 19, 1980). 
180 45 Fed. Reg. 33156-57 (May 19, 1980). 
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years since RCRA's enactment to develop technical facility stan-
dards for hazardous waste facilities, and despite having presented 
a fairly complete assemblage of these types of standards in the 
draft regulations,191 EPA now declares it may be years away from 
fully compiling detailed national technical standards for hazard-
ous waste facilities.192 Consequently, as an interim measure, EPA 
pledges to issue sometime in the fall of 1980 a second phase of 
moderately technical standards for many types of hazardous 
waste facilities. 193 These Phase II regulations will provide the ba-
sis by which permit applications for facilities can be technically 
evaluated via the regulators "best engineering judgment,"194 an 
apparent euphemism meaning that ample flexibility and discre-
tion will be afforded EPA in negotiating and deciding permits. 
EPA declares that these Phase II regulations will contain both 
site-specific and waste-specific factors as well as a more system-
atic method of facility evaluation to determine the safety and se-
curity of a facility.191i The Phase II regulations will become gen-
eral status standards and be incorporated, where appropriate, as 
interim status standards as well. 198 The Phase II regulations are 
not envisioned as the highest and best standards for hazardous 
waste facilities, but primarily as interim means to determine 
whether a facility will adequately safeguard human health and 
the environment.197 The third phase of EPA's regulations is con-
ceived as providing maximal and definitive control of hazardous 
waste facilities and as providing thoroughly detailed technical re-
quirements for hazardous waste operations.198 The best estimate 
EPA can provide as to the time Phase III regulation will take 
effect is that it is several years away.199 In the meantime, the in-
ferior standards embodied in the Phase I and II regulations will 
reIgn. 
EPA concedes that with Subtitle C Congress wanted hazardous 
waste facilities stringently and fully regulated as quickly as possi-
,., See note 177, supra. 
, •• 45 Fed. Reg. 33156-57 (May 19, 1980). 
, •• [d. 
, •• [d. 
, •• [d. 
, .. [d. 
'97 45 Fed. Reg. 33157 (May 19, 1980). 
, •• 45 Fed. Reg. 33156 (May 19, 1980). 
, •• [d. 
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ble.loo But EPA's incremental and tentative three-phase strategy 
for implementing controls for hazardous waste facilities is con-
trary to full and expeditious regulations. EPA's reliance on in-
terim status standards indicates that its method for controlling 
hazardous waste facilities will, for several years, provide little 
more than modest protection from the perils of hazardous waste. 
Congress provided for interim status in order to facilitate the 
smooth transition from a virtually unregulated situation to full 
national regulation for hazardous waste facilities. In the 
meantime it was Congress' intent to allow existing facilities to 
continue operating until permit applications were determined for 
the approximately 26,000 hazardous waste facilities nationwide.II01 
Though it seems inconceivable that Congress wanted the lesser 
interim status standards to continue for several years, that is ex-
actly what EPA indicates will and must occur due to insufficient 
resources to facilitate swift processing of permit applications. 101 
During the initial stages of EPA's review of permit applications 
most of the nation's 26,000 hazardous waste facilities will be oper-
ating under interim status standards. It will be at least two, prob-
ably more, years before most of the hazardous waste facilities will 
have permits under the Phase II rules. Likewise, during the ex-
tended and indeterminate period of several years the Phase II 
regulations are in effect hazardous waste facilities with permits 
will not be subject to standards assuring adequate protection to 
people and the environment. 
2. Inadequate Enforcement 
A regulatory program is only as good as its enforcement.2oa 
There are few better ways to inspire and keep public confidence 
.00 45 Fed. Reg. 33157 (May 19, 1980) . 
••• 45 Fed. Reg. 33158 (May 19, 1980) . 
••• Id . 
... RCRA provides federal and state governments and citizens with a broad range of 
enforcement measures, including: permit suspension or revocation, RCRA § 3005(d), 42 
U.S.C. § 6925(d) (1976); withdrawal of state authorization, RCRA § 3006(e), 42 U.S.C. § 
6926(e) (1976); inspection of hazardous waste activities, RCRA § 3007(a), 42 U.S.C. § 
6927(a) (1976); compliance orders, civil penalties up to $25,000 per day, and criminal pen-
alties for knowing transportation to an unpermitted facility, unpermitted disposal, and 
making false statements in applications, manifests, labels, and reports, RCRA § 3008, 42 
U.S.C. § 6928 (1976). Section 7003 of RCRA additionally authorizes EPA to bring suit to 
immediately restrain or take any other action necessary against the handling, storage, 
treatment, transportation or disposal of hazardous or solid waste which poses an imminent 
or substantial danger to health or the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1976). 
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about the safety and security of hazardous waste facilities than by 
strict, prompt, and full enforcement of environmental and safety 
standards. State agencies regulating hazardous waste activities 
have a poor reputation in this regard. The current crisis over fa-
cility shortfall and siting which many regulatory officials blame 
on citizen opposition is more correctly the fault of the dreadful 
past regulatory behavior which allowed 90 percent of all hazard-
ous waste to be disposed improperly and thus inspired public 
mistrust about present and future hazardous waste control. Here 
too, despite the stated sincerity and determination of many regu-
latory officials to make Subtitle C control work well, successful 
enforcement of this program depends principally upon adequate 
financial support. When the GAO contacted twenty-six states in 
1978 it found that all of them inadequately enforced even the 
limited hazardous waste control programs which they had.l04 Citi-
zens and state regulatory agencies will differ on the adequacy of 
state regulation. Many regulatory officials might be predictably 
self-satisfied or defensive about their performance while citizens 
are displeased. In fact, citizens have ample justification for dis-
trusting sincere pledges by state regulatory officials that hazard-
ous waste facilities will be properly regulated. Such promises have 
been made before, only to be followed by serious hazardous waste 
mishaps. lOG 
.o. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 139, at 6. I.. A prime example of failed promises of safe and secure hazardous waste regulation 
was the 1977 fire and explosion at the Rollins chemical treatment and disposal plant in 
Logan Township, New Jersey. This catastrophe killed seven laborers, sent forty-five po-
licemen and firemen to the hospital (some are still experiencing health disorders as a re-
sult of the disaster), and exposed over 400 people to harmful and deadly gases and liquids. 
The fire consumed hundreds of thousands of gallons of toxic chemicals, transforming them 
into airborne gases spreading out into the broader environment, including the burning of 
45,000 gallons of highly toxic polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB's). In testimony before a 
House Subcommittee in early March, 1978, Glenn Paulson, Assistant Commissioner of the 
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, submitted a brief history of his 
state's hazardous waste regulation program, praising the Rollins facility as a model opera-
tion of the kind the state would encourage within its borders. Obviously this document 
lauding Rollins was written before it blew up. For several years prior to the Rollins confla-
gration, New Jersey environmental protection officials prided themselves on what they 
considered a growing get-tough policy against improper hazardous waste activities. Consid-
erably less satisfied with New Jersey's regulation were the citizens and local government 
officials of Logan Township. To convince Logan Township to grant a permit for the build-
ing of the chemical treatment plant, Rollins guaranteed that surface water impoundments 
holding wastes would possess impermeable liners to protect groundwater. In fact, no such 
liners were installed, and seeping wastes polluted underground water until the state finally 
stepped in and ordered protective measures. After Rollins was built, citizens repeatedly 
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The regulatory failures which have led to serious hazardous 
waste .pollution corroborate the citizen perception that the per-
missiveness state regulators sometimes exhibit toward risky haz-
ardous waste activities will not be automatically removed by the 
adoption of new, supposedly stringent state control programs/~oe 
Compromises by regulatory officials toward improper and often 
dangerous activities at hazardous waste sites is the inevitable con-
sequence of inadequate regulatory budgets and rapid waste 
growth exceeding regulatory capabilities. Though the states are 
the usual targets of citizen disenchantment and anger over poor 
enforcement of hazardous waste control, the federal government 
as well can be the object of criticism for slow or poor regulatory 
response. lB07 
protested to the state about dangerous, improper, and illegal activities at the facility-but 
to little avail. The responses of state officials to citizen complaints and reports of improper 
activities at the "model" Rollins facility were always slow and weak-kneed. Harried and 
squeezed by a tight regulatory budget and by hazardous waste generation which outran 
instate capacity to properly manage it, New Jersey officials chose indulgence toward 
abuses at the Rollins facility over swift and stem enforcement actions to protect citizens 
from what is widely regarded as an inherently dangerous business. The consequences of 
this forebearing regulatory response, though somewhat understandable in light of difficult 
circumstances, were continued, worsening transgressions and pollution, contributing even-
tually to the disaster at Rollins. See testimony of Paulson and Logan Township Solicitor 
Kenneth A. Dimizio, regarding the Rollins disaster, in House Subcommittee on Transpor-
tation and Commerce, supra note 76, at 138-45, 196-205. 
The Love Canal catastrophe exemplifies equally well the incredible indolence state and 
local officials have sometimes exhibited toward toxic substance pollution. At first, the Ni-
agara County Health Department and city govenment did not consider the Love Canal 
situation an emergency and played down the problem. When citizens reported mysterious 
releases of toxic substances and serious health disorders to their children and themselves, 
the N.Y. State Department of Environmental Conservation conducted very little investiga-
tion. Only after the State Department of Health entered the picture was the matter finally 
regarded as urgent. Brown, N.Y. Times (Jan. 21, 1979) (Magazine), reprinted in 125 CONGo 
REc. S6827 (daily ed. June 4, 1978) (exhibit accompanying remarks of Sen. Dale Bumpers) 
[hereinafter cited as BROWN) . 
... Id. 
... On May 15, 1979, the State of Michigan notified the Department of Defense and the 
EPA of its intent to sue for their failure to stop the discharge of toxic substances onto the 
ground at the Wurtsmith Air Force Base near Oscoda, Michigan. In October, 1978, EPA 
discovered serious groundwater contamination at the base caused by trichloroethylene 
(TCE), a toxic degreasing agent for airplane engines and other equipment. The TCE in the 
ground extended up to 4 miles from the base and EPA declared that it posed an imminent 
threat to nearby surface waters. Soon afterwards, EPA iSBued an administrative order 
compelling the Air Force to clean up the TeE. However, after the order was issued, noth-
ing was done by the Air Force, the situation worsened, and EPA failed to follow through 
on the order. As a result, Michigan threatened a lawsuit. 10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 122-23 
(May 25, 1979). 
Only after the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee 
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With or without adequate federal funding it is a good bet that 
most, if not all, of the states generating the largest amounts of 
industrial hazardous wastes will institute hazardous waste pro-
grams under Subtitle C. However, many of these programs will be 
instituted for the wrong reasons. State officials often boast that 
state administration of pollution control programs established by 
the federal government is more "flexible" and "responsive" to in-
dustry than federally run programs.20S In fact, it has been sug-
gested that the claims of flexibility and responsiveness made 
about state programs are euphemisms for favoritism toward in-
dustry.2os Regulatory bias favoring the powerful industrial sector 
could take an insidious form in state siting determinations for 
hazardous waste facilities. Because decisions to site a hazardous 
waste facility must now anticipate and respond to public opposi-
tion, decision makers have become increasingly conscious of polit-
ical solutions. The opportunistic regulator and site proponent will 
seek and favor sites where there is the least opposition. That 
often means locations where the least politically potent of our so-
ciety-poor and minorities-live. The State of North Carolina 
has been accused of following this course of least political resis-
tance in its recent plan to establish a hazardous waste landfill to 
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce applied intense pressure in early 1979 did the EPA 
reverse its policy of intentionally not searching for and not investigating inactive hazard-
ous waste dumpsites which might present severe and imminent hazards to the public and 
the environment. See reference to Brown article in CONGo REC., supra note 205 . 
••• In a late spring 1979 conversation with the author in Indianapolis, Dave Lamm, then 
acting chairman of the solid waste management section of the Indiana Board of Health, 
said that Indiana's industrial waste generators and waste management firms very much 
wanted the state and not EPA to regulate hazardous waste because they believed the state 
would be more "flexible" and "responsive." Lamm shared that sentiment. For the justifi-
cations typically given for maximizing the state role in hazardous waste control while 
downplaying the federal role, see 2ND ANNUAL RCRA REPORT, supra note 8, at II-20 to 21. 
The reasons listed for preferring the states over the federal government as hazardous 
waste regulators were: 1) the state is more familiar with its people, problems, and solu-
tions; 2) it is better able to tailor a program to suit the needs of its citizens; 3) because 
some states have existing programs, it is more sensible to build on them rather than have 
EPA preempt or needlessly duplicate them; 4) state involvement results in greater public 
participation and education; 5) without a strong state role, siting of hazardous waste facili-
ties is likely to be more difficult; and 6) states have traditionally regulated waste activities 
under their police power to further public health and sanitation . 
••• William Goldfarb, The Hazards of Our Hazardous Waste Policy, 19 NAT. RESOURCES 
J. 259 (1979) [hereinafter cited as GOLDFARBj. In addition, in note 45, at page 259 of his 
article, Goldfarb reports that citizens in Ohio sued EPA to force the withdrawal of the 
state's authority to conduct its own water pollution discharge program on the grounds that 
state agencies were overly lenient with violators. 
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take PCBs (polychlorinated biphenyls) which had been illegally 
dumped elsewhere.2l0 
The beginning and end points of enforcing hazardous waste 
control are investigating violations, and if necessary, taking viola-
tors to court. United States Assistant Attorney General James W. 
Moorman told the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1979 that the 
major problem in toxic materials control is that both EPA and 
the Justice Department lack the financial resources to support 
enough investigators, technical experts, and government attorneys 
to search out most toxic substance violations and bring violators 
to court.2l1 The same enforcement disabilities plague the states.212 
Moorman said that while the disposal of poisons is one of the 
most serious environmental issues of our time, it appears to rank 
low among the Federal government's environmental protection 
concerns in view of the small amounts of funds and manpower 
devoted to enforcing hazardous waste pollution laws.2lS In mid-
1979 the Administration announced that EPA and the Justice 
Department would mount a long-needed, aggressive and well-
funded investigation and enforcement campaign against aban-
doned and closed waste sites where improperly treated or dis-
posed wastes seriously imperil the environment and public 
health.2H EPA is perfectly justified in seeking to correct the haz-
ardous waste mistakes of the past, but if Subtitle C regulation is 
to succeed, the federal government and the states must also look 
to the present and future and undertake an equally strong com-
110 The State of North Carolina proposed locating a hazardous waste dump in Warren 
County. This landfill was to receive 40,000 cubic yards of soil from along 210 miles of rural 
state roads which had been contaminated by the illegal dumping of PCB's. Warren County 
has only 16,000 people, 70 percent of whom are black, and is the poorest of the state's 100 
counties. One citizen advocate charged that Warren County was chosen because its re-
sidents were "few, poor and black." "Three Plead Guilty to Dumping PCB's in North 
Carolina," N.Y. Times, at A19 (June 15, 1979). 
III 9 ENVIR. REp. (BNA) 2328 (April 13, 1979). 
III For example, New York Assistant Attorney General John F. Sheer told a House 
Commerce Subcommittee that New York State lacks the funding and staff to investigate 
hazardous waste violations and bring transgressors to court. 10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 122-23 
(May 25, 1979). 
III See 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 2328 (April 13, 1979) . 
... To fund federal investigations and lawsuits against illegal and harmful dumping of 
hazardous wastes at abandoned or inactive sites, President Carter in June, 1979 asked 
Congress to authorize for FY 1980 $45 million and 70 positions for EPA, and $1.2 million 
and 30 positions for the Department of Justice. The Administration's request of $46.2 
million was far short of the $131 million both agencies originally informed the White 
House they needed to do the job properly. 10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 223-25 (June 15, 1979). 
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mitment to investigate and litigate against those violating Subti-
tle C regulation. That unfortunately has not happened, for EPA 
and the states still lack both present and long-term assurances of 
the financial and manpower resources needed to investigate ear-
nestly and litigate against violators of hazardous waste regulation. 
3. Funding Alternatives 
The prospects are dim for soon providing state and federal haz-
ardous waste control programs with the adequate financial secur-
ity they need to function successfully. In November 1979 Presi-
dent Carter approved a $22 million fiscal year 1980 appropriation 
for EPA's hazardous waste activities, a $9.6 million increase over 
the previous year/nil As the measureably improved fiscal year 
1980 appropriation was still not enough, EPA reprogrammed for 
hazardous waste control an additional $12.6 million, plus 235 peo-
ple from other Agency activities.218 The President's proposed 
fiscal 1981 budget contemplated further increased authorizations 
for Subtitle C program development and enforcement,217 but 
these plans were announced before the pressures of the demo-
cratic presidential primary campaign and uncontrolled inflation 
compelled the President to propose in February 1980 that the na-
tional budget be balanced. The President's Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) directed all federal agencies to recommend 
spending cuts for fiscal year 1981. In response to the OMB direc-
tive, EPA proposed a $1 billion budget reduction for its activities, 
nearly all of which was to come out of the program for sewage 
construction grants to the states.218 This EPA proposal, as was 
evidently intended, would spare most of its own programs from 
funding cutbacks, and even allow for planned increases to hazard-
ous waste control.219 The EPA savings recommendation would pe-
nalize the states, the prime benficiaries of the sewage construction 
grants. But EPA's strategy to protect funding for its own pro-
grams by inflicting virtually all the financial reductions upon 
III 10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1537 (Nov. 5, 1979); 10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1610 (Dec. 7, 
1979) . 
• 11 10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1678 (Dec. 21, 1979). 
117 The President's proposed fiscal year 1981 budget called for a $111 million authoriza-
tion for EPA hazardous waste regulatory activities, $30 million for state hazardous waste 
program development grants, and $10 million for federal enforcement activities against 
hazardous waste violations. 10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1938 (March I, 1980). 
III 10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 2113 (March 14, 1980). 
"" Id. 
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state sewage construction grants is not likely to gain Congres-
sional acceptance. Congress can be expected to insist that any 
EPA budget cuts be more equitablly distributed, providing for 
EP A programs to suffer reduced funding as well. Hence, even the 
best intentions of the Administration and EPA to increase spend-
ing for hazardous waste control seems destined to experience a 
setback in the war against inflation. 
What hope there is for adequate long-term financial security 
for Subtitle C regulation remains with the states. The two major 
options available for adequate state funding are 1) legislative ap-
propriations; or 2) measures compelling hazardous waste genera-
tors to support all or most of the costs of Subtitle C regulation of 
their wastes. Considering the past and continuing unwillingness 
of many legislatures to provide adequate funds for hazardous 
waste control,220 the first option does not appear promising. 
GAO advises the states to pursue the second option and levy 
fees or charges on the disposal and treatment of hazardous 
wastes.2U Essentially, this would impose a large part of the costs 
of maintaining state regulatory programs upon hazardous waste 
facilities as to make these programs largely self-supporting. GAO 
found support for the fee concept from nearly all of the state and 
EPA officials it contacted.ulI Most of these officials had not previ-
ously considered the idea of self-supporting regulatory programs. 
In 1974, before the enactment of. Subtitle C and its present fund-
ing difficulties, EPA rejected waste disposal fees for regulatory 
program support.2118 GAO reports that as of 1979 only seven to 
eight states levied charges for solid waste and only California and 
Maryland had hazardous waste charges. 224 
••• See text at notes 151, 153, and 169, supra . 
... COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 139, at 17-1H. 
•• 1 [d. at 18. 
I •• [d. at 17 . 
••• California and Maryland utilize the two major forms of waste disposal charge. Cali-
fornia, which established its fee system in 1974, adopted what is called the fixed fee or 
tonnage charge, so named because it is set at a fixed dollar amount per ton of wastes 
received by the waste facility, regardless of the waste type. On the average, the California 
fee constitutes about 50 percent of the total waste management costs borne by the hazard-
ous waste generator. The California fee is still insufficient to defray all the costs of the 
state's hazardous waste control program. Moreover, the new demands of Subtitle C will 
generate even greater program costs for California. Maryland has adopted a variable dis-
posal fee, so named because it reflects the degree of risk a specific kind of hazardous waste 
poses to the environment and public health, and the expense for government control re-
quired to safely manage and properly respond to this risk. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF 
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Disposal charges are an excellent way to achieve one of the pri-
mary goals of hazardous waste control embodied in Subtitle C, 
which is to shift the costs of hazardous waste pollution and con-
trol from the general public to the specific producers and consum-
ers of the goods and services leaving behind the hazardous wastes. 
In short, disposal charges leading to partially or fully self-sup-
porting hazardous waste control programs make the polluter pay 
for its own regulation. Moreover, disposal charges should be at-
tractive to legislatures because they reduce the appropriations 
needed to fund state hazardous waste control programs. 
The federal government, particularly EPA, has not vigorously 
promoted disposal charges and self-support for state hazardous 
waste programs. The quickest and most direct means for institut-
ing hazardous waste disposal charges nationwide is through a fed-
erally required charge. Unfortunately, the federal interagency Re-
source Conservation Committee, created by RCRA to study major 
waste and material conservation issues,2211 has endorsed the con-
cept of disposal charges for solid wastes only, rejecting the con-
cept of a national charge in favor of leaving its adoption up to the 
individual states.228 Few states have yet shown much interest in 
disposal charges and their great value for helping hazardous waste 
or solid waste control programs to become more self-supporting. 
The GAO has recommended that EPA seek legislation allowing it 
to impose disposal charges for state hazardous waste programs it 
must take over. A congressional report recommended legislation 
requiring the states to utilize fee systems for hazardous waste 
generation to finance state control programs.227 EPA has been in-
different tp these suggested improvements. 
THE UNITED STATES, supra note 139, at 27-29. The Maryland fee is initially collected from 
the facility operator as part of the operating permit fee and is a condition precedent to 
obtaining such a permit. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 8-1413.2(j) (Michie Supp. 1979). 
Oregon has also adopted a fee system in which hazardous waste generators and facilities 
help pay the costs of regulating hazardous waste sites. Oregon requires an annual license 
fee for an operator of a hazardous waste disposal site. The fee fixed is established to reflect 
the amount which the state determines is adequate to defray its costs of monitoring and 
surveilling the site. OR. REV. STAT. § 459.610-670 (1979) . 
••• RCRA § 8002(j), 42 U.S.C. § 6982(j) (1976) . 
••• See RESOURCE CONSERVATION COMMITTEE, CHOICES FOR CONSERVATION (SW 779), Of-
fice of Solid Waste United States Environmental Protection Agency (June 1979) . 
... SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE 
AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, supra note 37, at 50, 59-60. 
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V. FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILlTy228-A MISGUIDED ApPROACH TO 
CONTROL 
Section 3004(b) of RCRA authorizes EPA to establish stan-
dards governing the financial responsibility of owners and opera-
tors of hazardous waste facilities permitted under Subtitle C.22e 
Financial responsibility generally refers to the capability and lia-
bility of the facility owner or operator to pay for proper mainte-
nance and operation of a site, the site's proper closing, the long-
term care of a closed site, and for remedial action and damages 
resulting from the release of hazardous wastes into the environ-
ment.230 EPA has issued a partial set of regulations governing 
financial responsibility231 and these contain mere guidelines for 
estimating the costs of securely closing a hazardous waste site232 
and the costs of proper long-term care for a closed site/a33 After 
receiving significant criticisms about its proposed regulations for 
financial responsibility, EPA decided to revise its !>roposal.234 The 
revised financial responsibility requirements are proposed for 
both interim status and general status application and prescribe 
the financial mechanisms available to the hazardous waste facility 
for achieving financial responsibility.23& 
Implicit in a national hazardous waste policy that allows the 
generation and disposal of huge amounts of long-lived wastes is 
recognition of the fact that some places will become long-term 
toxic pollution sinks capable of injuring health and the environ-
ment. One high ranking EPA official has conceded as much.238 
Few communities are willing to sacrifice themselves to this fate . 
••• This article does not discuss financial responsibility and liability for waste sites, such 
as Love Canal, which were closed or abandoned prior to Subtitle C enactment or regula-
tion and thus not subject to Subtitle C control. 
••• RCRA § 3004(6), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(6) (1976) . 
... 43 Fed. Reg. 58986-88 (Dec. 18, 1978) . 
... 45 Fed. Reg. 33243-44 (May 19, 1980) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 265.140, .142, 
.144) . 
... 45 Fed. Reg. 33243-44 (May 19, 1980) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 265.142) . 
••• 45 Fed. Reg. 33244 (May 19, 1980) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 265.144) . 
... 45 Fed. Reg. 33260-65 (May 19, 1980) . 
••• 45 Fed. Reg. 33265-78 (May 19, 1980) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 265.140). 
••• In a speech to the American Chemical Society recommending state preemption for 
hazardous waste facility siting, EPA Deputy Assistant Administrator Gary Dietrich said, 
"The purposeful dedication of parcels of land as pollution sinks, for the ultimate disposal 
of pollutants, must be allowed, albeit with care and stringent management. The hazardous 
waste program must admit to and allow long-term, perhaps perpetual pollution sinks." 9 
ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 2295-96 (April 6, 1979). 
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The existence of financial mechanisms for hazardous waste dam-
age and care at regulated sites, while necessary, evidences the in-
appropriate thrust of Subtitle C control: regulating hazardous 
waste after it is generated and at disposal rather than reducing 
waste generation at the source.18? More wastes mean more pollu-
tion sinks at which they are disposed, and matters are only made 
worse when financial mechanisms for waste site care and liability 
are deficient. 
Liability insurance requirements for operating waste sites,181 
called site life liability standards, are necessary because of the po-
tential for damage to people and property from hazardous waste 
operations. To the extent that the facility owner or operator lacks 
sufficient financial resources to compensate third parties for dam-
ages, injured parties and government may be forced to bear the 
costs. 
There are two types of hazardous waste damage to which liabil-
ity could apply: sudden and nonsudden harm to the environment, 
people and property. lIe Examples of sudden waste damage inci-
dents are explosions, ground spills, and fires. Nonsudden damage 
at hazardous waste sites typically involves the prolonged or latent 
release of toxicants into the environment and the latent onset or 
discovery of noticeable injury to the environment, human health, 
and property. Love Canal's twenty year hiatus between its closing 
and the occurrence of disastrous waste releases is the classic ex-
ample of nonsudden damage at a closed waste site.140 Less dra-
matic than Love Canal but much more significant is the slow but 
sure contamination of underground water supplies by active and 
II. See Section VI. infra. 
... Liability insurance for hazardous waste releases is like any other form of industrial 
liability insurance in that it is a contract between the insurer and the insured. The insured 
pays a premium in return for which the insurer agrees to protect the insured against legal 
obligations incurred due to stipulated kinds of occurrences causing bodily injury or prop-
erty damages. See testimony of James L. Kimble. House Subcomm. On Consumer Protec-
tion and Finance, Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, Hearings on the Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act Amendments H.R. 9616 and S. 1531, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., at 368 
(March 7, April 24 and July 24. 1978); John E. Blodgett, Pollution Damages and Insur-
ance (ch. XV), reprinted in HousB COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION, COM-
PBNSATION rOR VICTIMS or WATER POLLUTION, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. at 370 (May 1979) 
[hereinafter cited as BLODGETT]; Michael E. Shannon. Long-Term Care and Liability Is-
sue Related to Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage in Disposal Sites, reprinted in EPA 
1975 PROCEEDINGS ON HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGBMBNT at 335-53 (1976) [hereinafter cited 
as SHANNON]. 
••• 43 Fed. Reg. 58987 (Dec. 18. 1978). 
... See note 13. supra. 
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closed hazardous waste disposal sites around the nation.241 
The development of EPA regulations for site life liability has 
been hampered by the fundamental problem of attempting to as-
sure adequate indemnification protection for the public without 
requiring prohibitively expensive coverage. EPA appears headed 
toward a solution to this problem which sacrifices fair and ade-
quate indemnification protection for the public in favor of keep-
ing hazardous waste facilities in business. 
The proposed regulations contained site life liability require-
ments which were applicable to general status facilities, but not 
to those with interim status permission.u2 Accompanying the 
final regulations, EPA issued a revised proposal for site life liabil-
ity which also covered interim status facilities but only for non-
sudden damage incidents. In The minimum insurance level for the 
general status standards were not contained in the new proposal, 
but they were reopened to public comment, clearing the way for 
possibly amending them.144 EPA's revised proposal for site life li-
ability coverage for interim status facilities allows a significant re-
duction in indemnification protection when compared with the 
general status liability requirements contained in the original pro-
posal. It can be feared that the new proposal for interim status 
facilities foreshadows and opens the way for an erosion in the in-
demnification protection originally proposed and then reproposed 
for general status facilities. Since general status site life liability 
measures were of questionable adequacy in the first place, any 
diminution in indemnification protection for permitted facilities 
would not benefit the public. A discussion of the shortcomings of 
the site life liability standards for interim status facilities which 
have been newly proposed by EPA should serve to demonstrate 
the dangers of replicating these defects in the final regulations for 
general status facilities. 
The interim status site life liability standards newly proposed 
by EPA would require the owner or operator of a hazardous waste 
facility to carry minimum insurance coverage for only sudden ac-
14. Over one-half of the nation's industrial disposal facilities, active and closed, leak 
toxic contaminants into groundwaters, making them unsafe as drinking sources for genera-
tions, if not forever. 2ND ANNUAL RCRA REPORT, supra note 8. More than 100 million 
Americans depend on groundwater for their drinking supply. HOUSE,. RCRA MATERIALS, 
supra note 16, at 40-41. . 
141 45 Fed. Reg. 59007 (Dec. 18, 1978). 
I .. 45 Fed. Reg. 33273 (May 19, 1980) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 265.147). 
144 45 Fed. Reg. 33260-61 (May 19, 1980). 
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cidental damage at the amount of $1 million per incident as well 
as $2 million per firm in the aggregate on an annual basis.l411 In 
contrast, the original proposal specified that in order to be per-
mitted a general status facility must maintain insurance for sud-
den accidents in the amount of $5 million per site per occurrence 
and for nonsudden accidents in the amount of $5 million per oc-
curence and $10 million on an annual aggregate basis.uS 
EPA reduced the minimum site life liability insurance require-
ment originally proposed at $5 million for sudden accidents at 
general status facilities to $1 million for interim status facilities 
because it said the lower figure represented current underwriting 
levels and would be adequate. There is little convincing evidence 
to support the EPA reduction, which appears to be more con-
cerned with the affordability of already costly insurance for haz-
ardous waste facilities than with the availability of adequate in-
demnification funds for hazardous waste damage. In support of 
the reduced site life liability coverage for interim status facilities 
EPA relied both on information from a few insurers that small 
firms typically maintain coverage ranging from $300,000 to $1 
million for sudden accidentsl .' and on the fact that four states 
known to prescribe insurance coverage for sudden accidents have 
required coverage ranging from $300,000 to $1 million. l • e EPA 
does not address the possibility that these reported levels of in-
surance coverage for sudden damages could represent the limits 
of affordable insurance while still falling far short of providing 
adequate indemnification protection. What data EPA does have 
on damage costs for sudden incidents at operating sites is ex-
tremely limited, yet it forms the insufficient basis for EPA's latest 
proposal. EPA indicates that it undertook an extensive analysis of 
its damage report files to ascertain a proper required level of cov-
erage for interim status facilities. In that analysis only one sud-
den occurrence was found where damage was estimated, and it 
was for $216,500 in 1979 dollars.··' This is hardly enough data on 
which to determine the typical cost, if there is such a thing, of a 
sudden damage incident at a waste facility. In contrast, EPA's 
discussion of its original site life liability proposal for general sta-
••• 45 Fed. Reg. 33273 (May 19, 1980) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 265.147). 
••• 43 Fed. Reg. 59007 (Dec. 18, 1978) . 
... 45 Fed. Reg. 33263 (May 19, 1980) . 
••• ld . 
... ld. 
516 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 8:463 
tus facilities explained that the "dollar value of damage incidents 
in EPA files ranges from $100,000 to many millions of dollars."2~o 
EPA further noted that it "is not unrealistic to imagine claims of 
several million dollars against a hazardous waste management 
facility. "2~1 
EP A portrays the $2 million annual aggregate coverage pro-
posed for interim status facilities as offering increased indemnifi-
cation protection that will assure adequate coverage for sudden 
accidents.m Just the opposite might be the case because the an-
nual aggregate minimum coverage is to be maintained on a per 
firm rather than a per site basis. Again, EPA justifies its proposal 
as reflecting conventional insurance industry practices. EPA ex-
plains that insurers generally provide coverage to all facilities 
owned or operated by a firm under a single policy because, 
through the use of an annual aggregate, they are able to take into 
account the risk of multiple accidents occurring for a firm which 
owns one or more facilities. us But this insurancE: industry prac-
tice is not meant to maximize compensation protection to third 
parties. Instead it is based on a calculated business judgement of 
spreading the risks of indemnification and maximizing coverage 
of costly premiums for the insured hazardous waste business. In 
effect, liability coverage on a per-firm rather than a per-site basis 
dilutes required coverage in direct relation to the number of facil-
ities a firm owns or operates. 
The EPA proposal may be correct in its assumption that the 
minimum coverage it would require is adequate. But EPA's con-
clusion is based on speculation rather than on firm data. As EPA 
admitted in its original proposal for site life liability, the "major 
difficulty in establishing insurance and indemnification levels is 
the lack of actuarial data on a regulated waste management. "2~4 
EPA noted that what information it has primarily is derived from 
an unregulated industry and that while its regulations will reduce 
the risks of hazardous waste facilities, "the degree to which this 
will occur is open to speculation. "UG 
EPA is in the difficult position of trying to strike a balance be-
••• 43 Fed. Reg. 58987 (Dec. 18, 1978) . 
••• Id . 
••• 45 Fed. Reg. 33263 (May 19, 1980) . 
••• Id . 
... 43 Fed. Reg. 58987 (Dec. 18, 1978) . 
••• Id. 
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tween assuring adequate indemnification protection to the public 
while keeping liability insurance levels from being prohibitively 
high. But implicit in the mere attempt to attain such a balance is 
the belief that it is achievable, which, in this case, it may not be. 
EPA's decision to propose relatively low minimum site life liabil-
ity coverage for sudden damages at interim status facilities obvi-
ously contributes to the viability of already costly regulated dis-
posal practices. But because of insufficient data on insuring 
hazardous waste facilities it can neither be proved nor is it obvi-
ous that the low coverage required for interim status facilities 
achieves what should be the primary objective of site life liability 
requirements, which EPA has declared "is to insure that funds be 
available to satisfy legitimate damages claims against a facility 
during its operating life. "III. 
At first glance EPA's proposed site life liability requirement for 
sudden accidents at interim status facilities appears to be an im-
provement over the original regulatory proposal which did not re-
quire any type of coverage for interim status facilities. However, 
this is a dubious improvement if, as EPA admits, many thousands 
of the 26,000 hazardous waste facilities will have to operate under 
interim status standards for several years. Furthermore, while any 
measure of indemnification protection is wise for interim status 
facilities, it legitimates the minimal environmental and public 
health protection embodied in interim status facility standards 
that will prevail for years due to EPA's lack of resources with 
which to implement the stronger general status facility standards. 
The fact that the insurance coverage proposed for the interim 
status period is much less than the coverage proposed previously 
for general status facilities could be used as a preliminiary justifi-
cation for reducing EPA's final liability requirements for general 
status facilities from the initially proposed levels. This is because 
the number and severity of damage incidents theoretically should 
be less at facilities which have been thoroughly reviewed and 
granted general status permits than those facilities with rudimen-
tary interim status permission. 
When EPA first recommended its site life liability require-
ments for general status facilities it received complaints that the 
insurance cost was prohibitively high.11I7 At the time EPA dis-
... Id . 
••• Id. 
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missed the complaints, declaring that after a review of premium 
costs for its originally proposed liability requirements it con-
cluded the insurance costs were not unreasonable.258 Nevertheless 
EPA's proposal to require minimum coverage of $5 million per 
occurrence per site for both sudden and nonsudden accidents and 
of $10 million annually in the aggregate for nonsudden accidents 
appears to approach the outermost limits for which insurance 
coverage can be obtained at hazardous waste sites. If one wanted 
to encourage hazardous waste management activities, one of the 
best ways would be to lessen costly site life liability coverage. 
The critical insurance protection for hazardous waste facilities, 
whether operating or inactive, is for nonsudden damage inci-
dents.259 In its various regulations for site life liability, EPA ap-
pears to be capitulating to the problems in providing adequate 
indemnification coverage for nonsudden accidents. 
Generally, insurance companies will not issue industrial liabil-
ity policies for non sudden pollution, apparently because the risks 
of frequent and severe damage are too great.260 The gradual or 
steady release of hazardous substances from wastes is often not 
discovered until extensive and costly damage has occurred, par-
ticularly to underground water supplies.261 The costs of cleaning 
up nonsudden waste damage can be enormous and well beyond 
the $5 million per incident and $10 million annual aggregate in-
surance levels specified by the general status regulations, as evi-
denced by the contamination at Love Canal and the Rocky 
Mountain Arsenal262• In an analysis of ninety damage incidents 
from its damage report files, EPA found that seventy-five were 
nonsudden events.263 
EPA's requirements for nonsudden site life liability coverage 
are not now adequate. Any reduction in these monetary standards 
would further deprive the public of even a modest guarantee of 
indemnification for nonsudden damage. It is alarming to find 
completely absent from the regulations indemnification protec-
tion from nonsudden damage caused by interim status facilities. 
"·Id . 
••• Id . 
••• It is standard for an industrial liability insurance contract to contain an exclusion of . 
liability clause for pollution damages which are neither sudden nor accidental nor unex-
pected. See BLODGETI', supra note 238 . 
•• , See text and notes at notes 18-19, supra, and note 241, supra . 
••• See note 13, supra and text at note 103, supra . 
••• 45 Fed. Reg. 33263 (May 19, 1980). 
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EPA declares it did not propose coverage for non sudden damage 
occurences at interim status facilities because the insurance in-
dustry appears unwilling to indemnify facilities until they have 
obtained general status permits.1I8f Consequently, during the sev-
eral years required to issue permits for all the nation's 26,000 haz-
ardous waste facilities the public will be deprived of indemnifica-
tion protection for the most threatening form of waste 
damage-nonsudden pollution occurrences-at the many 
thousands of hazardous waste facilities operating under interim 
status. 
Another weakness in the site life liability provisions of the draft 
regulations is their failure to address nonaccidental damage 
caused at permitted facilities. Because of the unavailability of in-
surance for nonsudden and non-accidental occurrences,1I81i the 
regulations defer these liability disputes to traditional tort reme-
dies governed by applicable negligence and strict liability princi-
ples.1I88 Insurers will be inclined to dispute claims by insured facil-
ity operators that a damage incident at a site was accidental and 
thus indemnifiable. Due to the exceedingly high standard of care 
necessary for the safe operation of inherently dangerous hazard-
ous waste facilities, insurers should have little trouble proving 
that most damage mishaps are nonaccidental and thus not indem-
nifiable under insurance coverage required by the regulations. Be-
cause liability insurance coverage for nonaccidental damage is to-
tally unavailable or unaffordable, when such damage occurs the 
costs of clean-up and recompensing the injured will fall in whole 
or in part on the taxpayers and the victims.1I87 
... [d. 
... See note 260, supra. 
He For an explanation of the application of tort law to toxic substance pollution, see 
Costello, Tort Law Principles, in COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF WATER POLLUTION, note 
238, supra, at 321-38. 
... Love Canal provides one illustration of the extent to which taxpayers bear the costs 
of hazardous waste pollution. More than $20 million may be required to relocate 200 fami-
lies, buy property, perform remedial construction, and conduct additional testing and 
monitoring. Federal assistance for Love Canal so far totals $6 million: $2 million in disas-
ter relief and a $4 million grant from EPA for fiscal year 1979. 2ND ANNUAL RCRA RE-
PORT, supra note 8, at 1-3 to 4. Michigan recently created a hazardous waste service fund 
for use in hazardous waste emergencies. The fund is established at a minimum of $1 mil-
lion and to be financed by legislative appropriations. After the fund has been used in 
response to actual or potential damage from hazardous waste, the State Attorney General 
can begin proceedings to recover the expenditure from the person responsible for the 
emergency. Of course, the emergency may cost more than the $1 million minimum level of 
the service fund, and the site owner may lack the capital, insurance, or bonding sufficient 
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The careful closing of a hazardous waste site is just as impor-
tant as conscientious site selection and operation. Pursuant to the 
closure standards prescribed by the regulations288 an owner or op- . 
erator of a hazardous waste facility will no longer be able to aban-
don or close a waste site and neglect precautionary measures for 
securing the idle site against future waste releases. At the time 
the hazardous waste facility stops accepting wastes, an event 
called closure, the regulations provide for a closure period, not to 
exceed three years in duration, during which time the site is to be 
rendered secure against future waste releases.289 The critical ele-
ment required for proper closure is the assurance that there will 
continue to be available sufficient funds to properly close the site 
when the time comes even if the site is prematurely abandoned 
by an insolvent owner or operator. EPA's proposed interim status 
and final regulations furnish the assurance of adequate closure 
funds by requiring as a prerequisite to the issuance of a permit 
that the facility owner or operator establish a trust fund or obtain 
a surety bond, letter of credit, guaranty or any other financial 
mechanism which can adequately cover estimated closure 
expenses.270 
Because the closure regulationsll71 order the complete removal 
of hazardous wastes from sites occupied by most types of closed-
out treatment, storage or disposal facilities, these sites can be re-
stored to relatively unrestricted use afterwards and there is often 
little or no need to monitor and maintain them against waste es-
capes in the future. In contrast, the total removal of hazardous 
to recompense the state for a serious hazardous waste emergency. Mich. Hazardous Waste 
Management Act, 1979 MICH. PUB. ACTS, No. 64 § 43(1) (July 25, 1979) . 
... There are two types of closure requirements in EPA's final rules. First, there are 
general requirements, many of which are administrative in nature. 45 Fed. Reg. 33242-43 
(May 19, 1980) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. § 265.111-115). Second, there are specific tech-
nical requirements, which are included in regulations for specific types of hazardous waste 
facilities. For tanks, see 45 Fed. Reg. 33245 (May 19, 1980) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. § 
265.197); for surface impoundments, see 45 Fed. Reg. 33246 (May 19, 1980) (to be codified 
in 40 C.F.R. § 265.228); for land treatment, see 45 Fed. Reg. 33248 (May 19, 1980) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. § 265.280); for landfills, see 45 Fed. Reg. 33249 (May 19, 1980) (to be 
codified in 40 C.F.R. § 265.310); for incinerators, see 45 Fed. Reg. 33250 (May 19, 1980) (to 
be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 265.351); for thermal treatment, see 45 Fed. Reg. 33251 (May 19, 
1980) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. § 265.381); for chemical, physical and biological treat-
ment, see 45 Fed. Reg. 33251 (May 19, 1980) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. § 265.404) . 
... 45 Fed. Reg. 33242 (May 19, 1980) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 265.113(b». 
"0 45 Fed. Reg. 33265-73 (May 19, 1980) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 265.143) . 
... See note 268, supra, for final closure rules for tanks, surface impoundments, land-
spreading, incinerators, and thermal, physical, chemical and biological treatment facilities. 
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wastes discarded at a closed landfill, pit, or lagoon site is usually 
not possible, preserving the potential for future releases of wastes 
whose danger may endure for decades or even centuries. Conse-
quently, it is necessary to ensure that conscientious, long-term 
care be extended to the closed disposal sites at which hazardous 
wastes remain. Unfortunately, EPA's regulations do not assure 
the financial base needed to carry out long-term care for closed 
land disposal sites. 
Two major financial issues characterize the problem of long-
term care for closed hazardous waste land disposal sites. The first 
involves financial responsibility for monitoring and maintaining 
closed land disposal sites against waste releases, usually called 
post-closure care. The second concerns financial responsibility for 
damage liability to people and the environment which occurs or is 
discovered after the land disposal site has closed and secured. 
In addition to requiring an appropriate financial mechanism to 
assure proper closure,ll72 the regulations would require the use of 
the same types of financial mechanisms273 assuring that at the 
time of closure there would be adaquate funds to pay the cost for 
prescribed post-closure care for 30 years.274 The thirty year post-
closure period is entirely arbitrary and leaves unresolved the 
problem of financial and functional responsibility for long-term or 
perpetual site care following the thirty year period. Many hazard-
ous wastes, it will be recalled, have ill-effects which are long-lived. 
Several experts have endorsed careful monitoring and mainte-
nance for closed disposal sites for at least fifty to one hundred 
years.ll711 Someone must pay for long-term site care following the 
thirty year period of owner/operator financial responsibility. It 
seems that EPA's decision to limit owner/operator post-closure 
financial responsibility to thirty years is based on practical neces-
sity. Few businesses-waste disposal firms included-live as long 
as many of the enduring wastes inhabiting closed waste sites. En-
cumbering the owner/operator of a disposal site with post-closure 
costs for more than thirty years is too financially burdensome for 
... 45 Fed. Reg. 33265-68 (May 19, 1980) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. § 265.143) . 
... 45 Fed. Reg. 33265-73 (May 19, 1980) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 265.145). See text 
at note 270 . 
• 7. 45 Fed. Reg. 33243 (May 19, 1980) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 265.117(d)). 
n. One expert advocating a 50- to l00-year post-closure care period is Thomas Conry, 
director of the toxic waste program of the Technical Information Project. 9 ENVIR. REP. 
(BNA) 1746 (Jan. 19, 1979). 
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many hazardous waste disposal operations. 
EPA appears to assume that the states will provide and pay for 
the long-term or perpetual care of closed waste sites at the end of 
the thirty year care financed by the owner/operator. There is no 
guarantee, of course, that any state government will conscien-
tiously persevere in the extended care of hazardous waste disposal 
sites closed long ago and which appear safe and secure. As a re-
sult dormant toxins at closed waste sites will occasionally awake 
to threaten or actually injure public health and the environment. 
It has been noted that measures for site life liability adopted by 
the regulations are inadequate. Moreover, the regulations make 
no provision for owner/operator post-closure liability, whether ac-
cidental or nonaccidental. EPA had originally proposed that own-
er/operators obtain liability insurance to cover damages for injuri-
ous waste releases caused at closed hazardous waste disposal sites 
formerly permitted under Subtitle C.l'le EPA decided against re-
quiring owner/operator post-closure liability insurance because it 
was not readily available and, like surety bonds and individual 
facility trust funds, simply unafl'ordable at levels for truly ade-
quate coverage.1'l7 Requiring owner/operators to assume financial 
responsibility for post-closure liability could arguably close down 
the hazardous waste disposal industry because it would not be 
profitable for investors to encumber their assets for decades in 
order to cover liability at closed sites which produce no earnings. 
Industrial liability policies for dangerous activities ordinarily 
cover only sudden damage occurrences.l.178 However, as previously 
mentioned, the critical insurance protection for hazardous waste 
disposal sites, open or closed, is for nonsudden occurrences. I'll 
The insurance industry will not issue policies for nonsudden oc-
currences at closed disposal sites. lao The unavailability of post-
... An early but now abandoned EPA proposal called for owner/operator post-closure 
liability through private insurance or self-insurance. The proposal established minimum 
coverage at $5 million per closed site and for a maximum 40-year term. COMPTROLLER 
GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 49, at 23. 
177 Id. GAO found that only one of the many hazardous waste disposal firms it con-
tacted had post-closure insurance, and it was for less than $3 million, had an exhorbitant 
premium of $57,000, would only payout if the cause of damage occurred before the site 
closed (difficult to prove), and could be unilaterally cancelled by the insurer with thirty 
days notice. 
"8 See note 260, supra. 
"8 See text at note 259, supra . 
• 8. 43 Fed. Reg. 58987 (Dec. 18, 1978). 
1980] HAZARDOUS WASTE SITING 523 
closure liability coverage from private insurers underscores the 
substantial risks of closed disposal sites. 
EPA and the hazardous waste service industry recognize that 
the public needs reassurance that if a waste release occurs at a 
closed disposal site, the condition will be corrected and liability 
will be fairly covered. To fill the void for post-closure liability cre-
ated by the unavailability of private insurance, EPA and the 
waste service industry support the establishment of a self-sus-
taining national trust fund for post-closure liability protection.281 
Such a fund would be financed by a surcharge or fee assessed on 
the disposal of hazardous waste. Though EPA has promised to 
introduce post-closure trust fund legislation it has not fulfilled 
this pledge nor has it supported the post-closure trust fund bill 
recently introduced by Senator Randolph which has been strongly 
endorsed by environmental groups and the hazardous waste ser-
vice industry.282 
Even if the faults in the EPA's proposed regulations covering 
financial responsibility and liability for waste sites are corrected, 
it would do little to appease those citizens opposing hazardous 
waste sites proposed for their communities. The opponents of 
hazardous waste sites find no solace in the assurance that after a 
hazardous waste mishap the costs of environmental clean-up, 
medical expenses and property damage will be paid. Even if ade-
quate funds were made available for liability protection and site 
security it would not cure the inherent weakness of hazardous 
waste control; that no society has yet demonstrated that it can 
maintain long-term physical security against the release of lasting 
wastes into the environment from disposal sites.283 
••• The Administration and U. S. Senators John Culver and Edmund Muskie intro-
duced bills in the 96th Congress for a separate national trust fund covering damage caused 
by hazardous waste disposal sites inactive or abandoned prior to Subtitle C regulation. 
The Administration bill is S. 1341, and the Muskie-Culver bill is S. 1480 . 
••• The Randolph bill is titled the Hazardous Waste Post-Closure Liability Act, intro-
duced in the 96th Congress as S. 1325. Michigan has already created a disposal facility 
trust fund to pay the costs of long term care for disposal facilities after the state's statu-
tory requirement for 15 year maintenence and monitoring post-closure responsibility im-
posed upon the site owner has ended. The fund will be financed by a charge on each 
facility for a pro rata share of the $30 million fixed as the ceiling for the fund. No more 
than $2 million may be collected annually for the trust fund, collections must stop when it 
exceeds $30 million and collections must begin anew when the fund's balance dips below 
$20 million. Michigan Hazardous Waste Control Law, 1979 MICH. PUB. ACTS No. 64, § 42 
(July 25, 1979) . 
••• The intractable, long-lived character of chemical wastes and the inability of disposal 
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VI. RCRA FAILS TO REDUCE WASTE GROWTH 
Federal policy condones waste growth, which in turn is bound 
to promote citizen opposition to hazardous waste sites. In addi-
tion to their near natural antipathy to waste sites,284 citizens have 
been accused of ignorancell81 and selfishness288 in their opposition 
to hazardous waste facilities. But strangely enough citizen opposi-
tion to waste sites comes closer than federal policy to the para-
mount objective of RCRA, "to protect the public health and to 
conserve valuable material and energy resources .... "1187 Citizen 
opposition to waste sites boils down to a tacit critique of waste 
growth and implicitly dictates that the best and only long-term 
solution to the hazardous waste problem is the slowing or stop-
ping of its growth. 
Two weaknesses in RCRA reduce the Act's effectiveness in 
dealing with the hazardous waste problem. The first is that the 
Administration has not meaningfully and ambitiously promoted 
waste utilization and conservation measures to abate the growth 
of hazardous wastes. The second is that Subtitle C regulates the 
disposal rather than the generation of hazardous waste. The car-
dinal principal of sound pollution control is reduction of pollu-
tants. These two weaknesses in RCRA divert national hazardous 
waste control away from the reduction of hazardous waste 
generation. 
sites to lastingly prevent their hazards from coming into contact with people and nature is 
summarized well by Michael H. Brown: 
There is simply no such thing as a totally secure, self-contained landfill, a fact even 
those in the business admit. 'There is no proof a landfill, 100 years from now, won't 
leach,' says Paul Chenard, president of SCA Chemical Waste Services, Inc. He says 
disposal methods have improved. Pits can be lined with special plastic. Waste-disposal 
firms can excavate on clay-based soil, compact the ground, install standpipes to pump 
out leachate, and slope the final cover to minimize rain infiltration. But the state of the 
art is new and no one issues guarantees. 
BROWN, supra note 205 . 
... At Senate hearings, Senator John C. Culver observed, U[W]e know no one wants a 
landfill in their backyard and that communities object to hazardous waste facilities in 
their midst." SENATE RCRA OVERSIGHT HEARINGS, supra note 162, at 2 . 
... Beatrice Tylutki, New Jersey's solid waste administrator, is one state regulatory offi-
cial who has depicted citizen opposition as founded on ignorance about the safety and 
security of hazardous waste sites. 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1406-07 (Dec. 8, 1978.) 
... [d. In castigating citizen opposition to waste sites as narrow and selfish, Sandra 
Gardenbring, director of Minnesota's Pollution Control Agency, said, "We all share the 
benefits of hazardous waste manufacturing . . . we therefore must all share the risks." 
••• RCRA § 1003, 42 U.S.C. § 6902 (1976). 
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A. Failure to Promote Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Despite its name RCRA has not succeeded in furthering re-
source conservation and recovery for solid waste in general and 
certainly not for hazardous waste in particular. RCRA has been 
hampered in achieving these ends both by its own inherent limi-
tations and by the federal underfunding of the resource conserva-
tion and recovery provisions of the Act. In its implementation 
strategy for RCRA, EPA gave the lowest priority to resource con-
servation and recovery288 and this is reflected in the diminutive 
funding the Administration has been willing to direct toward 
these activities. Federal emphasis is on the disposal, not the re-
duction of wastes. The discrepancy between the two is so great 
that one disgruntled critic suggested that RCRA should more 
aptly be called DRIP, for Dump Regulatory and Investigatory 
Planning Act.289 
Another critic notes that the federal government has turned the 
resource conservation and recovery measures which were initially 
so important in RCRA into a "mere stepchild" of the Act.290 State 
and local governments lack the resources, expertIse, and experi-
ence to break down the considerable technological, administrative 
and economic barriers confronting resource conservation and re-
covery measures for reducing wastes. Only the federal govern-
ment has the ability to provide the incentives necessary to launch 
effective resource conservation and recovery for wastes on a na-
tionwide basis. RCRA and other federal legislation that it com-
plements or superseded, have provided some opportunity for ad-
vances in resource conservation and recovery. Unfortunately, 
these opportunities have been bypassed by the federal 
government. 
The precursor of RCRA is the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 
1965, as amended by the Resource Recovery Act of 1970,291 which 
initiated the government's first major efforts in waste manage-
••• COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, CONVERSION OF UttBAN WASTE TO EN-
ERGY: DEVELOPING AND INTRODUCING ALTERNATE FUELS FROM MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE 4-6 
(Feb. 28, 1979) . 
••• Congressional testimony of Jerold Prod, Chairman of the California State Solid 
Waste Board, in House Subcomm. on Transportation and Commerce, supra note 76, at 
12-16 [hereinafter cited 88 Prod Testimony) . 
... 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 2114 (March 3, 1979) . 
•• , Pub L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 997 (Oct. 20, 1965) as amended by Resource Recovery 
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-512, 84 Stat. 1227 (Oct. 26, 1970). 
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ment. Major features of this early legislation included grants to 
public agencies for waste management planning,292 and federal 
programs for research, development and demonstration projects 
for resource conservation and recovery techniques.293 In addition, 
other legislation authorized loan guarantees for research and de-
velopment of resource conservation and recovery measures with 
energy saving applications.294 
RCRA could have provided a superb beginning for a national 
program of resource conservation and recovery for wastes because 
of the significant programs authorized by the Act. Subtitle D2911 
authorizes EPA grants and technical assistance to aid states and 
sub-state agencies in developing and implementing solid waste 
management plans. EPA was authorized to provide technical as-
sistance to state, sub-state and local agencies for resource conser-
vation and recovery-including teams of experts formed into re-
source conservation and recovery panels whose services were to be 
free. 296 Subtitle G, among other things, authorizes EPA to issue 
grants and contracts for training supervisory personnel for solid 
waste disposal and resource recovery.297 Subtitle H298 authorizes 
broad research, development, demonstration and information 
programs dealing with resource recovery and conservation as they 
relate to waste management.299 EPA is authorized to consult and 
join with the Department of Energy in research on energy recov-
ery from wastes.300 RCRA establishes the cabinet level inter-
2.2 [d. §§ 204, 205, 216 . 
•• 3 [d. § 204 . 
••• The Energy Conservation amI Production Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-385, 90 Stat. 
1125, authorized loan guarantees to encourage implementation of renewable resource en-
ergy measures; for example, fuel derived from refuse. The Department of Energy Act of 
1978-Civilian Applications, Pub. L. No. 95-238, 92 Stat. 47, also authorizes loan guaran-
tees to foster a demonstration program for energy derived from wastes. 
2 •• RCRA §§ 4001-4009, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6941-6949 (1976) . 
••• RCRA §§ 2003, 2006(b), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6913, 6916(b) (1976) . 
•• 7 RCRA § 7007,42 U.S.C. § 6977 (1976) . 
••• RCRA §§ 8001-8007, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6981-6987 (1976) . 
••• RCRA § 8001,42 U.S.C. § 6981 (1976), authorizes EPA to study, among other things, 
the economics of resource recovery facility development; RCRA § 8003. 42 U.S.C. § 6983 
(1976), directs EPA to disseminate and serve as a clearinghouse for information on waste 
management and waste reduction subjects; RCRA § 8005(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6985(a) (1976), 
directs EPA to conduct studies and develop recommendations for administrative and leg-
islative actions on a wide variety of resource conservation and recovery and waste manage-
ment issues; RCRA § 8006, 42 U.S.C. § 6986 (1976), authorizes EPA to make grants to 
demonstration projects for resource recovery systems and for new and improved waste 
management operations. 
300 RCRA § 800l(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6981(b) (1976). 
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agency Resource Conservation Committee to study resource con-
servation inducements such as economic incentives and product 
charges.301 Subtitle E directs the Secretary of Commerce to stim-
ulate the broader commercialization of proven resource recovery 
technologies and the development of markets for recovered 
materials.302 
Federal spending for resource conservation and recovery pro-
grams before and after RCRA's enactment has been inadequate. 
During the ten years prior to RCRA federal agencies spent $50 
million, an average of $5 million yearly, on resource conservation 
and recovery research, development, and demonstration 
projects.303 In 1977, the first fiscal year of RCRA, EPA spent no 
more than $8.25 million for fifty-three research and development 
projects and studies relating to resource recovery and waste re-
duction.304 EPA has admitted its inability to provide adequate 
technical assistance to states and local governments through the 
resource conservation and recovery panels because of underfund-
ing and understaffing.30Ii For instance, in fiscal year 1978 EPA's 
panel budget was $3.4 million,306 although Congress authorized 
$7.6 million for panel activities.307 In 1975 EPA instituted grants 
to ~tate and sub-state agencies to demonstrate proper planning 
practices and stimulate implementation for resource recovery sys-
tems. For that year EPA received 201 applications for grants re-
questing a total of $11.7 million, but made only 17 awards total-
ling $790,000-simply because that was all the funds it had.30s No 
similar grants were awarded between 1975 and 1979 because 
RCRA, enacted in October 1976, made the grants contingent on 
the existence of approved state solid waste plans and no plans 
were likely to be approved before 1980 due to the time required 
to develop and review them.3oe No appropriations have been re-
S., RCRA § 8OO2(j), 42 U.S.C. § 6982(j) (1976). The EPA Administrator is to serve as 
chairman of the Resource Conservation Committee, consisting of himself, the Secretary of 
Labor, the Secretary of Commerce, the chairman of the Council on Environmental Quali-
ty, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Interior, and a representative of the 
Office of Management and Budget. 
S.I RCRA §§ 5001-5004, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6951-6954 (1976). 
s.s COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 288, at V -2. 
s .. Id. 
'.1 Id. at IV-3 . 
... Id. 
3.7 RCRA § 2oo6(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6916(b) (1976). 
3.8 COMPTROLLER GENERAL 01' THE UNITED STATES, supra note 288, at IV-9 . 
... Id. 
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quested by the Department of Energy or EPA for authorized loan 
guarantees to energy-related resource conservation and recovery 
projects. 310 
Of the $8,000,000 Congress authorized for the activities of the 
Resource Conservation Committee, only about $2,000,000 was 
used. au Lack of adequate funding caused the Committee to get 
off to a slow start and forced it to have much of its work done by 
staff from the similarly understaffed and underfunded EPA.311 
The Committee has drawn considerable criticism from the waste 
industry and public interest groups for inferior research and for 
inattentiveness to several important economic incentives and dis-
incentives for resource conservation and recovery, such as subsi-
dies, severance taxes on natural resources, and discriminatory 
freight rates favoring recycled materials.313 
The Commerce Department has also been accused of failing to 
fulfill its RCRA responsibilities to expand markets and remove 
barriers for recovered waste materials.314 Commerce pleads it has 
been deprived of the necessary funds to carry out its RCRA du-
ties.3l1i For instance, Commerce had to abandon a study to deter-
mine the most favorable locations for resource and recovery sys-
tems after OMB cut from the Department's budget the $418,000 
needed to complete the project.31• 
There are several measures for reducing the amount and haz-
ardousness of industrial waste which are preferrable to disposal, 
which every expert declares should be the option of last resort.317 
31. [d. at IV-8. 
m [d. at IV-11. 
m [d. at IV-12. 
a.a [d. at IV·12 to 13. 
a.4 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 2371 (April 20, 1979). Edward L. Merrigan, counsel for the 
National Association of Recycling Industries, severely criticized the Department of Com-
merce for its failure to fulfill RCRA mandates to designate new markets, or even to iden-
tify existing ones, and for not identifying the economic and technical barriers to resource 
conservation and recovery. Testimony of Edward L. Merrigan, House Subcomm. on 
Transportation and Commerce, supra note 76, at 311. 
a.o 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 2371 (April 20, 1979) . 
... COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 288, at IV-14. 
a •• In a January 24, 1979 statement, former EPA Region I Administrator William R. 
Adams said the dispusal of hazardous waste "should be the option of last resort." 9 ENVIR. 
REP. (BNA) 1842 (Feb. 2, 1979). Steffen Plehn, EPA Associate Deputy Assistant Adminis-
trator of solid waste, told a March, 1979 solid waste conference in Washington, D.C. that 
the land disposal of hazardous waste should be the "last alternative" and said the first and 
preferred choice is no discharge of waste at all. 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 2114-15 (March 16, 
1979). 
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In order of preference these measures are: 1) waste reduction 
through changes in industrial processes; 2) waste separation and 
concentration; 3) waste transfer for re-use in other industries; 4) 
energy and materials recovery; and finally, 5) incineration or 
treatment to destroy or neutralize the wastes.3lS At present, only 
3 to 5 percent of the nation's industrial hazardous waste is recov-
ered,319 to the extent to which attempts are being made to reduce 
wastes by altering production processes is unknown. Virtually all 
the rest of our industrial hazardous wastes are discarded. 
Industrial hazardous waste reduction and reutilization has been 
scanty for four reasons. First, industry has found it cheaper and 
more practical to use virgin materials and throwaway their 
wastes.320 Second, federal government policies have long favored 
and stimulated the intensive use of virgin materials and condoned 
waste disposal.321 Third, the federal government has provided few 
III EPA DECISION-MAKER'S GUIDE, supra note 25, at 27. 
m DRAFT EIS, supra note 11, at V-56 . 
••• The past inadequacy of hazardous waste regulation led to routine improper disposal 
and made the discarding of these wastes considerably cheaper for industry than waste 
reduction or utilization. Over the years, improper, uncontrolled industrial waste disposal 
was tantamount to a huge subsidy for industry to pollute, because the cost of resulting 
environmental damage, injury to people and property, and remedial measures was borne 
by victims and the general public, rather than by waste generators. Proper hazardous 
waste disposal in compliance with Subtitle C will cost industry $750 million more yearly. 9 
ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1502-03 (Dec. 22, 1978). The "subsidy to pollute" which had been 
extended to industrial hazardous waste generators not only included costs saved due to 
improper disposal, but also the $44 billion it could cost to take remedial action against the 
up to 2,000 waste sites which EPA reports presently pose an imminent danger to health 
and the environment. See text at note 27, supra. 
a.. A major obstacle to the widespread application of resource conservation and recovery 
measures to wastes in general and hazardous waste in particular is a national policy heav-
ily favoring the use of virgin materials and the discarding of wastes: 
The federal government has historically played a major role in stimulating natural re-
source development. Special tax laws relating to mining and forestry and federal subsi-
dies for raw materials exploration, research, and development have all favored virgin 
raw materials and encouraged a materials-intensive economy. In addition, a number of 
laws and agency policies have tended to discriminate against recovered or recycled 
materials and waste reduction measures. Similarly, most state laws have E'ither tended 
to favor the use of virgin materials or not to have encouraged the recovery and re-
cycling of waste materials. DRAFT EIS, supra note 11, V-71 to V-72. 
For instance, special tax preferences for mining are equivalent to a direct cash subsidy 
of from 8 to 12 percent of the value of the output for coal, iron ore and copper mining, and 
those for logging represent a cash subsidy equivalent to 35 to 43 percent of the value of 
standing timber. All told, these tax subsidies amount to scores of billions yearly. U. S. 
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, FEDERAL TAX POLICY AND RECYCLING OF SOLID WASTE MATERIALS 
at V-71 to V-72 (Feb. 1979). 
What few tax incentives there are available to industry for waste recycling and recovery 
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incentives for industrial waste reduction and utilization.322 And 
fourth, there are inherent limitations to the application of re-
cycling and recovery measures for industrial hazardous wastes. 
Complicating recovery and recycling of industrial hazardous 
wastes is the fact that their chemical and physical characteristics 
are nearly as numerous and diverse as the millions of production 
processes which generate them.Sl3 Consequently, industrial haz-
ardous waste streams must be specifically suited or adapted for 
the manufacturing or energy producing activity which recovers or 
will always have a negligible impact compared to the tax breaks for virgin materials ex-
traction and use so long as heavy federal assistance is lacking to develop competitive mar-
kets and workable technologies for the various forms of better waste utilization. The Na-
tional Energy Act provides the latest federal tax concessions for resource conservation and 
recovery by industry. 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1265 (Nov. 3, 1978). The Act confers a 10 
percent tax credit for equipment used to process certain production materials for recycling 
and for equipment used to recycle materials for energy conservation . 
... According to Dr. James G. Albert, vice-president of the National Center for Resource 
Recovery, Inc., the major pre-conditions for widespread resource conservation and recov-
ery for wastes are the existence of strong markets and the availability of practical and 
economic technology. 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1422-26 (Dec. 8, 1978). At present, markets for 
recycled and recovered industrial wastes are at a primitive stage and unstable. The eco-
nomics of waste reuse could be boosted by government incentives for this purpose and 
disincentives on virgin materials use. The National Governors Association issued a policy 
statement on waste issues which urged the federal government to enact tax incentives for 
hazardous waste recycling and to issue regulations and tariffs giving the transportation of 
recycled materials a competitive advantage over virgin materials. 10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 
648-49 (July 13, 1979). 
The failure of the Department of Commerce and the Resource Conservation Committee 
to carry out their RCRA mandates for studying and promoting measures to expand re-
source conservation and recovery markets for wastes is hardly an auspicious sign for future 
federal action. Market development for the sale of industrial waste for use in the produc-
tion processes of other industries has been impeded by a lack of information and channels 
for transferring wastes from waste generators to potential users. Industrial waste ex-
changes are one excellent means for gathering and disseminating information on the types, 
quantities, and locations of wastes available for sale or for actually conducting waste sale 
transactions. Waste exchanges operate on the principle that "one industry's waste can be 
another's feedstock." The two basic kinds of waste exchange are the materials exchange 
and the information exchange or clearinghouse. 2ND ANNUAL RCRA REPORT, supra note 8, 
at V -5 to V -8. A materials exchange accepts waste, analyzes it, treats it and seeks out 
markets to sell it at a profit. An information exchange gathers and disseminates data on 
the types, amount and location of wastes available for sale, or on buyers seeking to 
purchase wastes. Industrial waste exchanges have done quite well in Europe for some time 
and at least 70 have opened in the U. S. since 1975, when there were none. In the face of 
growing interest and the very promising potential of industrial waste exchanges, by 1978 
EPA had the equivalent of only one staff person working full-time on promoting waste 
exchanges for the entire nation. See GAO REPORT-How TO DISPOSE OF HAZARDOUS 
WASTE, supra note 49, at 21. 
••• DRAFT EIS, supra note 11, at V -63. 
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recycles that waste. 324 This is often no easy task. 
According to EPA Deputy Assistant Administrator Stephen 
Plehn it is presently both technologically and economically feasi-
ble to recover and recycle much of the nation's industrial 
wastes.3215 However, the feasibility of the technology for resource 
conservation and recovery for wastes and the actual widespread 
availability and use of that technology are two different matters. 
The industrial technology for waste recovery and recycling lags 
light years behind the universally used conventional manufactur-
ing and energy generating activities fed by raw and virgin materi-
alS.326 Federal research and development support for reduction 
and reuse technology for industrial waste is generally insignificant 
and is nonexistent for industrial hazardous waste.327 The inade-
quacy of federal support for waste reduction technology is unfor-
tunate since Thomas Kimball, executive vice-president of the Na-
tional Wildlife Federation, says it is now economical to recycle 95 
percent of the waste generated by the pharmaceutical industry, 
66 percent of the petroleum industry's wastes, and 40 percent of 
the paint industry's wastes. 328 
B. Misplaced Regulation of Hazardous Waste Disposal 
By focusing regulation on the disposal of pollutants, Subtitle C 
deviates from the principal strategy adopted for the major com-
ponents of federal pollution control legislation329-the Clean Air 
Act330 and the Clean Water Act.331 Federal air and water quality 
legislation attacks pollution at its source, seeking source reduc-
tion by imposing discharge restrictions on the generators of pollu-
tants that could be released into the air and water. Federal air 
and water pollution control legislation fundamentally differs from 
Subtitle C in that the former two make the reduction of pollu-
tants the inescapable technical, financial and legal responsibility 
of their generator whereas Subtitle C divorces the generation of 
pollutants from its treatment and disposal, concentrates on treat-
••• [d., at V-63, V-64 . 
••• 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 2114-15 (March 3, 1979) . 
••• DRAFT EIS, supra note 11, at V-73. 
m See generally GAO REPORT-How TO DISPOSE OF HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 49 . 
••• 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1411-12 (Dec. 8, 1978) . 
••• For a critique of Subtitle C's preoccupation with the disposal of hazardous wastes 
and inattention to regulating h82ardous waste generation, see GOLDFARB, supra note 209 . 
••• 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1976) . 
•• , 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976). 
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ment and disposal, and fragments responsibility for the proper 
care of hazardous waste among generators, transporters, and 
waste site owners and operators. 
Congress' endeavor to control hazardous waste without source 
reduction operates on certain fallacious biases and assumptions 
about hazardous waste control. In fashioning Subtitle C Congress 
disregarded the technology-forcing approach of the Clean Water 
Act and the Clean Air Act both of which have been reasonably 
successful in compelling industry to utilize effective pollution dis-
charge equipment and techniques. SS2 Instead, Congress continued 
to embrace the long-held assumption that waste control at the 
end point of treatment and disposal is amenable to technological 
solutions, although past and present disposal and treatment tech-
nology has a poor record in containing hazardous waste pollution 
and the new treatment and disposal technology Subtitle C will 
create is unproven. SSS Anyone familiar with hazardous waste is-
sues knows that "disposal of hazardous waste should be the op-
tion of last resort,"SS4 ideally to be superseded by attempts to 
eliminate or reduce discharges in the first place. Past experience 
with the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act is evidence of 
the effectiveness of reducing pollutants at their source. Nonethe-
less, Congress chose to forsake producer discharge restrictions for 
hazardous waste apparently out of faithfulness to the free enter-
prise ideology that private production decisions are not to be in-
terfered with so long as other less intrusive alternatives for effec-
tive pollution control are available. 
A fundamental goal of Subtitle C is to compel hazardous waste 
generators to internalize the cost of proper hazardous waste man-
agement. EPA declares that the more stringent control of hazard-
ous waste will increase the costs of storage, treatment and dispo-
sal and thereby be an incentive to waste generators to reduce the 
amount of their hazardous waste by less costly methods of re-
cycling, by materials and energy recovery, or by altered produc-
tion processes.SSII However, the incentive for waste reduction at-
tributed to increased treatment and disposal costs brought on by 
Subtitle C control will probably not be sufficient to slow apprecia-
••• GOLDFARB, supra note 209, at 255. 
••• See text and note at 283, supra . 
... See note 317, supra . 
• a. DRAFT EIS, supra note 11, at S-37. 
1980] HAZARDOUS WASTE SITING 533 
bly the growth of hazardous wastes. 336 
Subtitle C's strategy of concentrating control on the ultimate 
treatment and disposal of pollutants through technical precau-
tions and standards is defensive pollution control at best and can 
do little more than mute the risks of hazardous wastes. Moreover, 
by leaving the source of these risks untouched, Subtitle C control 
allows them to grow along with the hazardous waste from whence 
they originate. One commentator noted that there may be serious 
consequences in Subtitle C's fragmenting of legal responsibility 
for hazardous wastes among generators, transporters and facility 
owners or operators.337 It is questionable whether Subtitle C im-
poses upon generators primary legal responsibility for the final, 
environmentally acceptable disposal of their wastes by waste ser-
vice firms.338 Once the hazardous waste generator has followed 
proper procedures in transferring the wastes to a permitted facil-
ity, its statutory responsibility for the waste ends and is suc-
ceeded by that of the waste transporter and finally the waste fa-
cility. Subtitle C does not offer a solution to the sparse and 
unsettled case law on the issue of the liability of the hazardous 
waste generator in management of the wastes by his successors. aae 
If not subjected to the fear of inevitable, unfailing regulatory en-
forcement and legal liability for the final proper treatment or dis-
posal of their hazardous wastes, many industrial generators will 
probably not engage in proper long-term on-site disposal and care 
and will not carefully select or scrupulously monitor disposal 
firms accepting their wastes. a40 This situation could be alleviated 
by federal legislation imposing continuing responsibility on indus-
trial generators for their hazardous waste regardless of where it is 
disposed until the waste is no longer hazardous. a41 Proper dispo-
II' GAO REPORT-How TO DISPOSE OF HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 49, at 8, 10, 17. 
"" See GOLDFARB, supra note 209. 
II. [d. at 255. 
II. See SHANNON, supra note 238, at 352. 
I •• GOLDFARB, supra note 209, at 255. 
1., The moat recent congressional report on hazardous waste strongly recommended 
that RCRA be amended to establish eternal generator responsibility for hazardous waste 
until the waste was no longer hazardous. The report stated: 
We further recommend that Congress embody the concept of eternal responsibility 
for the generators of hazardous waste, i.e., that the generators of waste should be 
liable for any hazardous waste product they produce whether they continue to have 
control over the waste or not. We believe this will encourage not only safer on-site 
activities but also careful selection of private disposal firms. . . . In addition, given 
the dangers associated with hazardous waste, the generators' liability should be 
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sal can cost ten to forty times more than improper disposal. 342 
The high price of proper disposal has in the past provided an 
enormous temptation for generators to circumvent proper dispo-
sal. That temptation will likewise continue today for treatment 
and disposal firms to cut costs and hike profits by improper waste 
management methods. 343 Furthermore, the extremely high cost of 
environmentally proper disposal, combined with regulatory pro-
grams chronically short of staff and funds, may spur many un-
scrupulous generators to circumvent manifest requirements or 
pass on their hazardous waste activities either to sham subsidiar-
ies or to friendly companies for cheap and unsound treatment or 
disposal. 344 By fragmenting regulatory control among various par-
ties and failing to concentrate regulation on source reduction, 
Subtitle C complicates regulation and aggravates the strains of 
based on the standard of strict liability. 
SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND 
FOREIGN COMMERCE, supra note 37, at 59-60 . 
... PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT 46 
(1977) . 
••• The profitability of improper disposal by waste service firms and the lack of concern 
by hazardous waste generators contracting for disposal with these firms is exemplified by 
one of the activities at a Houston, Texas chemical processing facility owned by Browning-
Ferris Industries (B.F.l.). B.F.I. has one of the largest waste management businesses in the 
country and is widely regarded as a reputable firm. Dupont gave B.F.l. the contract to 
dispose of about 100,000 gallons of highly toxic nitrobenzene-contaminated oil. At a Jl:ne 
18, 1979 hearing of the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, it was 
shown that B.F.I.'s improper disposal of the nitrobenzene was extremely profitable, while 
various proper disposal methods would have netted the firm a loss or only marginal prof-
its. B.F.I. stood to lose $562.65 per 4,200 gallon load of waste oil if it was disposed in an 
approved landfill, and would make only $290.85 per load for proper deep well injection. 
B.F.I. chose the much more profitable alternative of improper disposal. B.F.I. could expect 
a profit of $1,087.35 per load for oil given away for use as road oil and a profit between 
$1,235.85 to $2,075.85 if the oil was given away for use as fuel. B.F.l. provided the contam-
inated oil for use on road surfaces in east Texas and gave away thousands of gallons to an 
unregistered and unpermitted reclaiming business in Louisiana, which used the toxic oil 
for both asphalt-making and fuel oil. B.F.l. claimed they had no knowledge of what was 
done to the contaminated oil after it was given away. DuPont, not responsible for B.F.I. 
actions, apparently did not care what happened to the contaminated oil after paying B.F.I. 
to dispose of it. The House subcommittee also discovered that B.F.l. could not account for 
75,210 gallons of cyanide waste it acquired from DuPont for disposal. 10 ENVIR. REP. 
(BNA) 664 (July 13, 1979) . 
••• For example, !IOew Jersey reports that in large part because of the increasing costs of 
proper disposal, illegal hazardous waste disposal in the state is rising. 10 ENVIR. REP. 
(BNA) 656-57 (July 13, 1979). New Jersey can expect nothing else from its new and, at 
least on paper, tougher regulatory program, which it cannot afford to enforce properly and 
fully. See note 203, supra, regarding criminal penalties authorized by Subtitle C for know-
ing transportation to an unpermitted facility and unpermitted disposal. 
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underfunding and understaffing suffered by EPA and the states 
in carrying out hazardous waste control. 
The disturbing paradox of producer-discharge restrictions for 
hazardous wastes (as well as solid wastes) is that while they ap-
pear to be an ideal remedy for halting the growth of industrial 
wastes their use calls into question and possibly jeopardizes the 
entire structure of American pollution control. This predicament 
results from the fact that federal air and water quality legislation 
has itself contributed largely to the phenomenal industrial growth 
of solid waste and hazardous waste growth in recent years.3411 It 
appears that preventing the discharge of growing quantities of in-
dustrial residuals into the air and water has resulted in their ma-
terialization and accumulation in predominantly solid and liquid 
forms which require treatment and disposal at land-based waste 
sites.348 The growth in industrial wastes indicates that air and 
water pollution control efforts are ruled by the principles of the 
conservation of energy and matter.347 Current air and waste pollu-
tion controls neither destroy nor reduce pollution but merely 
change its form and situs when all environmental mediums are 
considered. Imposing discharge restrictions on industrial hazard-
ous waste generation, like those for air and water pollution, would 
breed substantial pressures and costs for industry since growing 
pollution generation could no longer escape and materialize as in-
dustrial wastes. The pressures and costs for industry would, no 
doubt, be immense if discharge restrictions were extended to all 
industrial waste generation, nonhazardous as well as hazardous . 
... It should be kept in mind that the cause of waste growth is not pollution control 
technology itself, but instead is the growth of polluting materials generated by increasing 
production, consumption, and population. 
A representative illustration of how federal air and water pollution control has boosted 
industrial hazardous waste growth can be found in four industry groups that are major 
generators of hazardous waste-inorganic chemicals, paper processing, steel, and oil refin-
ing. In the aggregate, waste generated by these four industries grew an astounding 150 
percent, from 110 million metric tons in 1972 to 260 million metric tons in 1976. Pollution 
control residuals accounted for three-quarters of this waste growth. Not all of the indus-
tries in the 14 leading industrial groups generating hazardous wastes are expected to expe-
rience the same exceedingly high degree of growth in pollution control residuals, but the 
trend is unmistakable. See note 62, supra, for the 14 major industrial hazardous waste 
generating groups. During the period from 1974 to 1983, total waste generation for all 
these industries is expected to grow 29 percent. At the same time pollution control residu-
als will increase 77 percent. HOUSE ReRA MATERIALS, supra note 16, at 22-25. 
"·Id. 
"7 A. KNEESE & B. BOWER, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND RESIDUALS MANAGEMENT 8 
(1979). 
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Industry resistance to proposals for explicit restrictions on waste 
generation would, no doubt, be fierce and formidable. Further-
more, it very well might be technologically and financially im-
practical for industry to reduce pollutants across all environmen-
tal mediums while maintaining production at high and growing 
levels. This sad state of affairs is an "implicit indictment"S48 of 
the ability of American pollution control policy to reduce success-
fully the production of pollutants. 
Attempts to tackle the problem of national waste growth cut 
more deeply into the nation's production system and way of life 
than either air or water pollution control. Much of our solid waste 
is the actual product of our manufacturing and consumption pat-
terns. Correspondingly, hazardous waste generation represents 
the by-products of manufacturing itself; The growth of industrial 
hazardous waste, like nonhazardous waste growth, results from 
increasing levels of American production and consumption. 
The ubiquitous and commonplace use of synthetic substances 
provides the best example of the influence production and con-
sumption patterns have on hazardous waste generation. The man-
made plastics, pesticides, fibers, detergents, and countless other 
synthetic items are creations of the organic chemical industry, 
(synonomous with the petrochemical industry because its feed-
stocks are derived from oil and natural gas).S49 The organic chem-
ical industry generates about one-third of the nation's industrial 
hazardous wastes, ranking first among fourteen major industrial 
categories which produce virtually all our industrial hazardous 
waste.8&O Since the end of World War II synthetic materials have 
grown from an extremely modest part of our economy to such as-
cendence that Barry Commoner labels the present the Synthetics 
Age. Sill The Synthetics Age is simultaneously the Toxic Materials 
Age, for most synthetic organic compounds are very toxic and 
••• GOLDFARB, supra note 209, at 250 . 
... B. COMMONER, THE POVERTY OF POWER 183-84 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 
COMMONER). 
••• See note 62, supra. 
... Total production of synthetic organic chemicals rose from about 300 million pounds 
in 1946 to 39 billion pounds in 1974. These statistics only confirm the common experi-
ence that the visible products of petrochemistry-plastics, synthetic fibers, detergents, 
and pesticides-have rapidly penetrated everyday life, flooding upon us in wave after 
wave of new materials and objects. 
COMMONER, supra note 349, at 187. 
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long lived.3tl2 Nearly 60 percent of all industrial hazardous waste 
is generated by the chemical industry.3Ci3 Moreover, nearly all the 
non-biodegradable synthetic products, such as plastics, end up as 
wastes. Whether synthetics production has improved the quality 
of life is debatable in light of the wastes such production gener-
ates. 3Ci4 About 71 percent of the volume of the organic chemical 
industry's hazardous waste is incinerated,3CiCi much of it in an en-
vironmentally unacceptable manner.3Ci6 About 18 percent of the 
chemical industry's hazardous waste is land filled, with 2 or 3 per-
cent of the industry's hazardous waste discarded by various other 
types of land-based methods.3Ci7 Again, nearly all the land-based 
measures for the disposal of the chemical industry's hazardous 
••• Life depends on the elaborate interaction of thousands of different natural organic 
compounds. This network of reactions has evolved over a three billion year period of 
trial and error and often does not tolerate the intrusion of new man-made substances 
that have not participated in the harmonizing process of evolution. This may explain 
why synthetic organic compounds are so harmful to living things. For example, in a 
survey of 835 organic chemicals that represent about two-thirds of the major products 
of the petro-chemical industry, nearly half of the ones that have thus far been tested 
for toxicity toward people were listed as having a "high" level of toxicity . . . many 
synthetic petrochemical products are so different from natural materials that the en-
zymes which in living things break down organic substances are unable to attack them. 
They are therefore non-biodegradable and accumulate as trash. 
Id. at 184-85 (emphasis added) . 
••• DRAFT EIS, supra note 11, at VI-2 . 
.... It might be legitimate to argue that for several kinds of synthetic organic compounds 
their benefits outweigh the disadvantages of their toxic wastes~for example, in the case of 
toxic residuals from pharmaceutical production and medical experiments which may result 
in health-improving or life-saving drugs and serums. However, medical and pharmaceuti-
cal wastes comprise a mere fraction of the total industrial hazardous wastes generated 
annually. For the most part there is no fundamentally superior or special function per-
formed by the vast majority of synthetics, which since World War II have rapidly dis-
placed wood, leather, paper and other naturally derived products for everyday uses. Barry 
Commoner asks and answers the question: 
Are petrochemical products unique in their uses ... ? A standard work on the chemi-
cal industry lists all the end-uses of products that are made from ethylene, the major 
secondary starting material for petrochemical products. Here, for example, are the end-
uses of plastic products, made from ethylene, that are classified as household goods: 
furniture, upholstery, flooring, wall coverings, curtains (shower and otherwise), 
tableclothes and place mats. . . . These items are remarkably non-unique. After all 
even before most plastics were invented, let us say in the 1930's, furniture was uphol-
stered, walls, floors and tables were covered, showers were curtained . . .. All these 
tasks can be met with materials other than plastics; natural fabrics, leather, paper, 
wood, and natural rubber, for example. 
COMMONER, supra note 349, at 190 . 
••• DRAFT EIS, supra note 11, at D-43 . 
••• Id . 
• 07 Id. 
538 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 8:463 
waste are environmentally unsound.3&8 Only 8 percent of the or-
game chemical industry's waste is subjected to recovery 
techniques.3&9 
Hazardous waste generation is rapidly approaching its growth 
limits and has become another issue in the debate between envi-
ronmentalists and industrialists over restricting economic growth 
in order to abate resource depletion and environmental degrada-
tion.880 We are simply running out of land suitable for the dispo-
sal of wastes.881 
In the final analysis the only truly effective relief from the last-
ing toxic wastes of synthetics manufacturing and other industries 
is to cut back on their production. There are some who hope that 
••• [d. at VII-30 . 
••• [d. at D-43. 
... Environmentalists and several distinguished economists and scientists have in recent 
years blamed the distinct character and unbridled growth of our industrial economy for 
our massive environmental degradation and resource depletion problems. See generally 
Boulding, The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth, in ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY IN 
A GROWING ECONOMY 3-14 (H. Jaffett, ed. 1971); D. MEADOWS, et. al., THE LIMITS TO 
GROWTH (1972); E. MISHAN, THE COSTS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (1967); E. MISHAN, TECH-
NOLOGY AND GROWTH (1970); B. SCHUMACHER, SMALL Is BEAUTIFUL (1973). The environ-
mental critics of economic growth call for curbs on production and consumption either 
through direct restrictions or conservation measures. On the other side of the coin are 
industrialists and conventional economists who defend growth on the basis of private en-
terprise ideology, self-interest, and the philanthropic argument that growth is necessary to 
maintain our afHuence and alleviate poverty. Growth critics point out that while our econ-
omy continues to grow, poverty is still with us and getting worse for the rest of the world, 
which suffers from the ability of the developed world to control and consume an over-
whelmingly disproportionate share of the world's capital and natural resources. 
In speaking about the hazards of long-lived nuclear wastes, but just as applicable to 
non-nuclear hazardous wastes, the late economist B. F. Schumacher sees moral madness in 
arguments trading supposed prosperity for the perils these wastes pose: 
No degree of prosperity could justify the accumulation of large amounts of highly toxic 
substances which nobody knows how to make "safe" and which remain an incalculable 
danger to the whole of creation for historical or even geological ages. To do such a 
thing is a transgression against life itself, a transgression infinitely more serious than 
any crime ever perpetrated by man. The idea that a civilization could sustain itself on 
the basis of such a transgression is an ethical, spiritual, and metaphysical monstrosity. 
It means conducting the affairs of man as if people did not really matter at all. 
B. SCHUMACHER, SMALL Is BEAUTIFUL 145 (1973) . 
.. , In RCRA Section l002(b)(6), Congress warned, "Alternatives to existing methods of 
land disposal must be developed since many of the cities in the United States will be 
running out of suitable solid waste disposal sites within five years unless immediate action 
is taken." 42 U.S.C. § 6901(b)(6) (1976). Land in urban areas which is environmentally 
suitable for waste disposal sites is limited and rapidly diminishing. Many industries now 
consider the availability of hazardous and non-hazardous waste sites as one of the major 
determinative factors in locating or remaining in an area, along with other traditionalloca-
tional criteria such as the availability of adequate water, labor and power. 
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all industrial hazardous wastes can be destroyed, but that hope 
seems as elusive as the promise that Subtitle C will result in 100 
percent containment of hazardous waste.362 In view of the persis-
tence and toxicity of many hazardous wastes, our national control 
policy must go beyond regulating disposal. It must rely more on 
discharge limitations and consider direct measures for eliminat-
ing, altering, or substituting production processes and consump-
tion patterns which create, utilize and discard growing quantities 
of pernicious materials. Unfortunately, any proposal for discharge 
restrictions- on industrial hazardous waste generation would en-
counter substantial opposition by American industry. Even 
stronger industrial opposition, if that is possible, would be 
mounted against the more radlcal restrictions on industrial pro-
duction itself. In recently enacted legislation to implement Subti-
tle C, Wisconsin made explicit the implicit hands-off policy which 
Congress adopted for industrial production processes generating 
hazardous wastes. The Wisconsin Hazardous Waste Management 
Act363 emphatically declares as a matter of policy that it "does 
not interfere with, control or regulate the manufacturing pro-
cesses which generate hazardous wastes. "364 
The major disability of RCRA and other state and federal ac-
tions for industrial waste management is the failure to make 
waste growth abatement the paramount concern. RCRA does not 
mandate and the federal government has little interest in a na-
tional strategy or plan for reducing waste generation in all its 
forms-municipal, industrial, hazardous and nonhazardous. The 
strict, environmentally sound regulation of hazardous waste stor-
••• EPA's Associate Deputy Assistant Administrator for solid waste, Gary Dietrich, told 
a June 21, 1979, meeting of the EPA Science Advisory Board that the agency's Subtitle C 
program was based on a philosophy of 100 percent containment, destruction or detoxifica-
tion of hazardous wastes and was not "depending on the surrounding environment in any 
way to contain or disperse the waste." 10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 531 (June 29, 1979). Die-
trich's disclaimer that the environment will enjoy complete immunity from hazardous 
waste pollution under Subtitle C contradicts another Dietrich statement made two months 
earlier that, perhaps, some permanent hazardous waste pollution will have to be accepted 
under this control program. See in this regard note 236, supra. Dietrich complained to 
EPA's scientific advisors that public pressure against the siting of industrial hazardous 
waste facilities will probably push the agency eventually to require the complete destruc-
tion of organic wastes, which do not degrade naturally. Dietrich's inference that someday 
total destruction of hazardous waste will be the national regulatory policy readily conveys 
the false impression that soon we will have a perfect solution for the problems of the 
growing output of industrial hazardous wastes . 
••• WIS. STAT. ANN. § 144.60-144.74 (West Supp. 1980) . 
••• [d. § 144.60(2)(d). 
540 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 8:463 
age, treatment, and disposal is absolutely necessary and greatly 
welcomed. But a self-defeating conflict materializes out of RCRA 
as it separates waste disposal from waste reduction and does not 
subordinate the former to a strategy governed by the latter. The 
federal government's failure to attack waste reduction in a com-
prehensive, financially well-supported fashion creates an atmo-
sphere in which resource conservation and recovery measures for 
wastes become halting, ad hoc, and incremental reactions to bits 
and pieces of the waste problem.8811 In these circumstances waste 
reduction is likely to lose in its competition with waste disposal 
for what meager federal attention there is for either. This is un-
fortunate. There is no reason to trade off one for the other, be-
cause, as one top state waste management official put it, disposal 
is a problem while resource recovery and conservation is an 
opportunity.888 
VII. CONCLUSION 
There is an inseparability to the problems of hazardous waste 
buildup in our society and of efforts to obtain more hazardous 
waste facility sites by overcoming citizen opposition. Generating 
more hazardous wastes generates the need for more waste sites, 
which ultimately generates more citizen opposition. It is myopic 
to view citizen opposition as the major obstacle to effective haz-
ardous waste control. The real impediment to effective hazardous 
waste control is the absence in national hazardous waste policy of 
a strategy that places paramount emphasis on the reduction of 
hazardous waste at its source which is coupled with the stringent 
disposal regulation which is the promise of Subtitle C. There is 
additional justification for citizen opposition in the past, current 
and prospective underfunding of regulatory programs which make 
them inadequate to protect public health and the environment 
from serious hazardous waste pollution . 
••• The latest, largest, and only half-way energetic federal commitment to resource con-
servation and recovery has been for municipal solid waste. In March, 1978, President 
Carter asked Congress to appropriate $15 million for federal grant assistance for urban 
resource recovery projects in FY '79. 2n ANNUAL RCRA REPORT, supra note 8, at V-2 to V-
6. Apart from being a pittance of what is really needed to assist the development of mu-
nicipal waste recovery, the federal government neglects all the other aspects of resource 
conservation and recovery of wastes, in particular industrial wastes . 
... See Prod Testimony, supra note 289. 
